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Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook LIU Yuejin *

时间:2023-12-25 14:42:31 阅读: 作者:

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook

LIU Yuejin

Abstract: The “New Security Concept” put forward by the Chinese authorities at the

turn of the century, with “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination”

at its core, dealt mainly with non-traditional security approaches and measures in

external security. However, it did not touch upon internal security or other traditional

or non-traditional security issues in a broader sense. Therefore it is a low form of

non-traditional security outlook and a low form of non-traditional national security

outlook. When reviewing overall national security issues besides external security

and international security, China has stuck to a traditional national security outlook.

In comparison, taking “the people’s security as its aim,” the Overall National Security

Outlook (ONSO) embodies non-traditional thinking and “attaches importance to both

traditional and non-traditional security.” It is, therefore, an advanced non-traditional

national security outlook. Though incorporating rich non-traditional national security

issues, the ONSO deals with various traditional national security issues, as well. The

ONSO is non-traditional in that it handles and highlights non-traditional national

security issues; it is holistic because it pays dual attention to both traditional and nontraditional

national security issues; it is advanced as it incorporates both traditional and

non-traditional national security issues by means of non-traditional thinking.

Keywords: overall national security outlook, non-traditional national security outlook,

non-traditional national security issues

1. From the “New Security Concept” to the “Overall National Security

Outlook”

The Overall National Security Concept put forth by Xi Jinping, the Communist Party

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 121

of China (CPC) General Secretary in April 2014 is considered a natural outcome of the

long-term exploration of the national security concept and pattern by the CPC Central

Committee and China’s central government.

The main goals of the CPC since its establishment have been to fi nd a road to rebirth

and rescue the country and its people from poverty and weakness, from external

humiliation and civil strife, in effect for the nation’s security. Although the concept of

“national security” did not exist at the establishment of the CPC, its political goals and

practical work were all centered on a major issue that had been on the mind of Chinese

pioneers since modern times: finding ways to rid itself of foreign invasion and the

humiliation imposed on the Chinese nation by eastern and western powers, as well as

the exploitation and oppression infl icted on its poor people by feudal forces within the

country. The anti-imperial and anti-feudal guidelines and goals are in fact the refl ection

of such a national security objective.

The term “security” was first used in an important CPC document in 1945 in a

report Mao made at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China

(NCCPC). In this report entitled “On Coalition Government,” which was later included

in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Mao pointed out in the 10th question —“Diplomatic

Issues”: “About the establishment of an international institution for peace and security,

the CPC agrees completely to the proposal made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference

and other related decisions reached at the Crimea Conference.”1 The “international

institution of peace and security” here referred to the subsequent United Nations.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the term “security” was

frequently used in fields like agricultural and industrial production and people’s

life. Expressions like “our country’s security,” “the country’s security,” and “our

motherland’s security” were often used to convey the idea of “national security”; just as

expressions such as “preparing for war,” “safeguarding the motherland,” “strengthening

combat readiness” and “taking class struggle as a guiding principle” were used to talk

about maintaining and safeguarding national security. However, the term “national

security” was not used specifically until 1983. Such national security theories and

practices without the term “national security” could be called “factual description and

practice of national security” in contrast to the “conceptual description and practice of

national security” built up since the fi rst use of “national security” in offi cial documents

in 1983.

The term “national security” appeared in China’s official documents in 1983 for

the fi rst time. Its initial appearance in Central Committee of the Communist Party of

China (CCCPC) documents was in 1986. The Report on the Work of the Government

to the First Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress (NPC) on June 6th,

1983 stated: “In order to ensure national security and strengthen counter espionage

efforts, the State Council proposes that the Congress approves the establishment of

1 Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Database of National Congresses of Communist Party of China, The

People (), http://cpc.people.com.cn/

GB/64162/64168/64559/4526988.html.

122 LIU Yuejin

the Ministry of State Security to strengthen the leadership of national security.” Three

years later, the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles of

Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of

the 12th CCCPC in September 1986 required the country’s citizens to “stand up and

fi ght bravely when national security is under threat or social public security is in

danger.” 2

From then on, the term “national security” wasn’t seen in important CCCPC

documents until the 9th Plenary Session of the 13th CCCPC in 1992, but appeared

many times in work reports of the central government submitted to the NPC. For

instance, “national security” appeared twice in the government work report to the

First Session of the Seventh NPC in 1988: one was in “combat espionage activities

against national security”; the other in “peoples in South African countries safeguard

national security.” It appeared twice in the government work report to the Second

Session of the Seventh NPC in 1989 and once in the government work report to the

Fifth Session of the Seventh NPC in 1992. Especially since the 14th NCCPC in 1992,

as the term began to appear more frequently in offi cial documents of the government

and the Party, the “conceptual description and practice of national security” evolved

into a normal state.

Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities’ understanding of national security before the

early 1990s was confi ned to traditional national security issues. Therefore, it is a quite

traditional national security outlook. To take the report of the 14th NCCPC in 1992 as

an example, all statements about national security, even any statement with the term

“security,” were seen only in the chapter “Construction of the Armed Forces.” It was in

the section of “strengthening military construction and national defense capabilities to

ensure smooth development of reform and opening-up and economic construction” that

the term “security” appeared 4 times, including a “national security”:

We must adhere unswervingly to the Party’s absolute leadership over the army,

uphold Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts about army construction in the new period, follow

the road of few but better troops with Chinese characteristics, build the People’s

Liberation Army into a powerful, modernized, and regularized revolutionary army,

and keep reinforcing our country’s national defense capacities so as to provide a

strong guarantee for reform and opening-up and economic construction. After the

disarmament of one million troops, the Army should adapt itself to the requirements

of modern warfare in the future, attach importance to quality construction,

comprehensively enhance its combat effectiveness so as to better accomplish its

sacred mission of protecting territorial land, airspace, naval sovereignty as well

as marine rights and interests and defending our motherland’s unity and security.

2 Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles of Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization (Adopted

at the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 28, 1986), The

People (

1986-9-28), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5104/5201/20010429/455518.html.

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 123

Meanwhile, the Army should consciously submit itself to the overall goal of national

economic construction, actively support and participate in reform and openingup

and modernization efforts and contribute to the country’s development and

prosperity...We must keep reinforcing the construction of the People’s Armed Police

Forces, public security and national security forces to better maintain national

security and social stability.3

Such a theory of putting national security under military category and treating it as a

military issue were undoubtedly a very traditional national security outlook.

In 1996, the Chinese government began to put forward new security ideas on

international occasions. The term “New Security Concept” was introduced in 1997;

the core of this new security concept was summarized as “mutual trust, mutual benefi t,

equality, and cooperation” in 19994 and revised as “mutual trust, mutual benefit,

equality, and coordination” in July 2001.5 There was then a systematic exposition of the

New Security Concept through the release of China’s Position Paper on New Security

Concept in July 2002.6 However, this New Security Concept dealt only with external

security and international security issues instead of complete national security issues.

Up until it fell almost completely out of use after 2006, the expression “New Security

Concept” had never been used to describe complete national security issues; its sphere

had always been limited to external security and international security. Consequently,

the “New Security Concept” denotes in contemporary China merely a non-traditional

national security outlook in external and international security instead of a complete

non-traditional national security outlook. Even if it could be called non-traditional, it

was just a partial non-traditional national security outlook. Firstly, this is because it only

deals with external national security issues, it is partial in the external-domestic aspect.

Secondly, as it is mainly based on subjective wishes instead of objective observations,

it is partial when considering the subjective and objective elements of national security.

Thirdly, it discards traditional security issues by emphasizing non-traditional ones and

is therefore partial in its understanding of the roles that traditional and non-traditional

elements play in contemporary national security.

In addition, for the fi rst fi ve or six years of the 21st century, while “New Security

Concept” was mainly used to express external security and international security, the

3 Jiang Zemin, “Speed up Reform and Opening-up and Modernization Efforts and Strive for Greater Victory for Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics” (October 12, 1992), Database of National Congresses of Communist Party of China, the People (

1992-10-12)

,http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313.html.

4 Jiang Zemin, “Promote Disarmament and Safeguard International Security Speech Delivered at the Conference on

Disarmament in Geneva” (March 26, 1993), The People (

1999-3-26), http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1999/jianghua/jh0005.

html.

5 Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the Rally in Celebration of the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of Communist Party of China”

(July 1, 2001) Xinhua (__________2001-7-1), http://news.

xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-12/03/content_499021.htm.

6 China’s Position Paper on New Security Concept (July 31, 2002), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (

2002-7-31), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/t4549.shtml.

124 LIU Yuejin

Chinese authorities began to talk more and more about other aspects national security,

including some non-traditional national security issues. But national security as a

whole was still put in the fi elds of military and national defense or foreign relations

in important documents. The emphases of national security thinking and activities

were still traditional securities issues centering on military and national defense and

foreign security. Consequently, these years saw a transition from traditional to nontraditional

in overall national security outlook instead of the formation of an overall

non-traditional national security outlook. This can been see in the report of the 16th

NCCPC held in November 2002. But the report of the 17th NCCPC in 2007, while still

refl ecting the transition, has shown some non-traditional features in national security

thinking and outlook.

We know that “security” and “national security” appeared only in the “Army

Construction” chapter in the 14th NCCPC Report in 1992. For the 15th NCCPC Report

in 1997, “security” was mentioned 6 times, with 3 times in the “Economy,” “People’s

Livelihood,” and “International Issues” parts. But the other 3 times are still in the

“Army Construction” part. The 16th NCCPC Report in 2002, in contrast, is the fi rst

document in NCCPC’s history that the term “security concept” has been mentioned

and that the “New Security Concept” with “mutual trust, mutual benefi t, equality,

coordination” at its core is proposed. In addition, the word frequency of “security”

more than doubled in the 16th NCCPC Report compared to that of the 15th NCCPC,

increasing to 14 times. More importantly, the term “security,” including “national

security,” appeared more in the “Economy,” “Politics” and other parts of the Report

than in the “Army Construction” and “International Issues” parts, thus meaning that

the Report took on certain non-traditional features in the domain of security, especially

in national security.

Since the 16th NCCPC in 2002, “national security” has been used more and

more frequently in various fields of social life. China began to use with increasing

frequency in its official documents both traditional and non-traditional constituent

elements, infl uencing elements, and hazardous elements of national security, such as

political security, economic security, cultural security, and information security. What

is more, while stressing the importance of traditional political and military forces

in safeguarding national security, it began to touch upon the role that elements like

economy, culture and science and technology play in safeguarding national security.

Such a trend was fully demonstrated in both the Decision of the Central Committee

of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Ability

Construction (hereafter referred to as Governance Ability Decision) adopted at the 4th

Plenary Session of the 16th CCCPC in 2004 and Decision of the Central Committee

of the Communist Party of China’s on Some Major Issues in Building A Harmonious

Socialist Society (hereafter referred to as Harmonious Society Decision) adopted at

the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th CCCPC in 2006. But the trend at the time had not

developed to the stage of establishing a complete non-traditional national security

outlook.

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 125

The word “security” appeared altogether 16 times in the Governance Ability

Decision, including “national security” 4 times. It appeared in expressions like “public

security,” “the people’s personal safety and property security,” “new security concept,”

“traditional security threats,” “non-traditional security threats,” “national security

awareness,” “national security strategy,” “national security,” “(national security) work

mechanism,” “political security,” “economic security,” “cultural security,” “information

security,” and “national defense security.” Many of these expressions, such as “public

security,” “national security awareness,” “national security strategy,” “national

security,” “(national security) work mechanism,” “cultural security,” and “information

security,” were not seen in previous NCCPC reports. The particular significance of

the Governance Ability Decision is that it made the first systematic statement in the

CPC’s history in the chapter with the heading of “Adhering to independent foreign

policy of peace and keeping improving abilities to cope with international situation

and handle international affairs.” It stated that the Party must “put national sovereignty

and security above everything else and firmly uphold national security.” “To cope

with the new situation brought about by interwoven traditional and non-traditional

security threats, we must enhance national security awareness, improve national

security strategy, and build a scientifi c, well-coordinated and effi cient national security

work mechanism.” “We must resolutely forestall separatist activities and activities

of infiltration and subversion carried out by hostile forces, effectively forestall and

tackle risks in the international economic fi eld, so as to ensure the nation’s political,

economic, cultural, and information security.”7 Here, three points should be made

about the Governance Ability Decision. First, the proposed “new security concept”

was not a non-traditional national security outlook concerning overall national security.

Although the Governance Ability Decision did not specify the contents and core of the

new security concept in the proposal, with the long-established external bound focus of

such a concept, the statements were still limited to foreign relations and international

issues and did not touch upon overall national security. Second, the Governance Ability

Decision repeated the judgment that “traditional and non-traditional security threats are

interwoven,” a conclusion fi rst put forward in the 16th NCCPC Report. But the main

ideas in this judgment were still traditional security issues, with traditional and nontraditional

threats in external security and international security as the focus. Third,

although the Governance Ability Decision covered issues beyond military construction

and foreign relations when it talked about security and national security, its general

statement about national security was still seen in the part of “foreign relations”; it did

not devote a separate part to this topic or discuss it within any other non-traditional

security issues. Therefore, despite having some rudiments of non-traditional national

security outlook within it, the Governance Ability Decision was, on the whole, still a

7 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Ability

Construction (Adopted at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee on September 19, 2004), The People,

(2004-9-19

), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/40531/40746/2994977.html.

126 LIU Yuejin

traditional national security outlook.

The Harmonious Society Decision, adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the

16th CCCPC on October 11, 2006, once again made similar yet briefer special

statements about national security than the Governance Ability Decision. It pointed

out that it was necessary to “strengthen national security work and national defense

construction and safeguard national stability and security.” “We must enhance

national security awareness, perfect national security strategy, and establish scientifi c,

well-coordinated, effi cient work mechanisms so as to cope with various traditional

and non-traditional security threats. We must strike hard at infi ltrative, subversive,

and sabotage activities of external and internal hostile forces to ensure the country’s

political, economic, cultural, and information security.”8 We can fi nd through word

frequency statistics that compared with the Governance Ability Decision in which

“security” was mentioned 16 times (including “national security” 4 times), “security”

appeared 24 times in the Harmonious Society Decision, including “national security”

5 times, but the term “New Security Concept” was no longer in the document. In

fact, this term had almost gone out of use in important official documents at this

point. The fade-out of the “New Security Concept” which is limited to external and

international security without any announcement or attention towards internal

security shows that China had in fact taken national security issues beyond

external and international security into broad consideration and was thinking of

a national security outlook that was broader and more comprehensive than “New

Security Concept.” It is in this historic process that a holistic overall national

security outlook was conceived. However, unlike the “New Security Outlook”

with noticeable non-traditional security features, the Harmonious Society Decision

displayed a predominance of traditional security thinking when it expounded

domestic security issues as a whole. The non-traditional security elements such

as “cultural security” and “information security” showed that while it was paying

more attention to some non-traditional security issues, China still attributed chief

threats to national security and social stability to hostile forces, reiterating that “the

hostile forces’ infiltrative and sabotage activities endanger national security and

social stability” and that it must “strike hard at infi ltrative, subversive, and sabotage

activities of external and internal hostile forces” to “ensure the nation’s political,

economic, cultural and information security.” The Harmonious Society Decision

failed to realize that various internal non-confrontational social conflicts, serious

corruption within the Party, government, and the PLA in particular, infl icted grave

threats and harm to national security, especially to internal security. It also failed to

realize the crucial signifi cance of maintaining national security, especially domestic

security, through the establishment of justice, democracy, and rule of law in domestic

8 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s on Some Major Issues in Building a Harmonious

Socialist Society (Adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

on October 11, 2006), Xinhua (2006-10-11

), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/

content_5218639.htm.

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 127

political and social life. This suggests that the guiding philosophy behind the

Harmonious Society Decision is still a traditional national security outlook.

However, as various constituent, influencing, and hazardous elements of nontraditional

national security began to be mentioned more and more frequently and

especially as national security issues were beginning to be discussed within the realm

of domestic social issues, it became apparent that a non-traditional national security

outlook was the shape of things to come. This was refl ected in the Report of the 17th

NCCPC in November 2007. The term “New Security Concept” was nowhere to be

found in the Report. Instead of appearing in the section of “Armed Forces and National

Defense Construction” or “International Relations and Foreign Policies” as it used to

be, a systematic statement about national security was made in the paragraph with the

topic sentence of “Improving social management and safeguarding social stability and

unity” in the section of “Accelerating Social Development with the Focus on Improving

People’s Well-being.” This is a major difference of the Report of the 17th NCCPC

with previous NCCPC reports. The change of national security issues’ place in the

Report suggests that the CPC Central Committee was convinced that the contemporary

emphasis of national security was neither external nor military security issues; it was

domestic social conflicts and issues and effective ways to solve them. The specific

statement is as follows: “We must improve the strategy and mechanism for national

security, and keep high vigilance against and resolutely forestall separatist, infi ltrative

and subversive activities in various forms to safeguard national security.” Nevertheless,

national security is indeed inseparable from armed forces and national defense

construction. Hence the Report talked about national security in the section “Opening

Up New Prospects for Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces”:

“Bearing in mind the overall strategic interests of national security and development,

we must take both economic and national defense development into consideration

and make our country prosperous and our armed forces powerful while building a

moderately prosperous society in all respects.” “We will strengthen the People’s Armed

Police so that it can better fulfi ll its duties of safeguarding national security and social

stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace.” This shows that nontraditional

national security thinking has been expanded and intensifi ed in the Report of

the 17th NCCPC.

By 2012 when the 18th NCCPC was held, although there was not “overall national

security outlook” in the sense of “conceptual existence,” a comprehensive and overall

national security outlook had taken shape in the sense of “factual existence.”

According to word frequency statistics, the word “security” appears 4 times in the

report of the 14th NCCPC held in 1992 with one of which being “national security,”

6 times in the report of the 15th NCCPC in 1997 with “national security” 3 times, 14

times in the report of the 16th NCCPC in 2002 with “national security” 3 times, and

23 times in the report of the 17th NCCPC in 2007 with “national security” 5 times. In

the report of the 18th NCCPC in 2012, there were 36 direct references to “security.”

Moreover, there are an additional 6 expressions that in effect express security (for

128 LIU Yuejin

instance food and drug safety). Thus the total number comes to 42, with 4 direct

references to “national security” and 2 expressions which in fact refer to “national

security” (one is the “work mechanism” in “perfecting national security strategy and

work mechanism” referring to the “national security work mechanism”; the other

is the “security strategy” in “adapting to new requirements in national development

and security strategy” referring to “national security strategy”). So the expression

“national security” actually appears 6 times in the Report. The word frequency

statistics of “security” and “national security” in those important documents is shown

in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Word Frequency of “Security” and “National Security” in NCCPC Reports

The 18th NCCPC Report mentions and discusses “security” and “national security”

more than all previous CPC national congresses combined, suggesting that the CCCPC

is attaching increasing importance to national security as it does with development.

Despite the increased discussion about non-traditional security issues in various aspects,

the focus of the Report is still on traditional security. Nevertheless, the Report shows

more non-traditional contents and thinking in national security issues. First, there were

more fi elds and statements concerning security in the Report, including many live nontraditional

securities issues at the time, such as grain security, food security, medicine

security, medical security, information security, cyberspace security, economic security,

security of people’s lives and property, public security, ecology security, energy

security, resource security, international security and so on. Second, the 18th NCCPC

Report discusses national security mainly in the section of “Strengthening and making

innovations in social management.” Such an arrangement follows the model of the 17th

NCCPC Report which puts national security statements in the category “Improving

social management and maintaining social stability and unity.” This shows that the

CCCPC is attaching increased importance to domestic social security, considering it

a priority among priorities in national security, which is in marked contrast with the

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 129

traditional security thinking where national security was perceived as political and

military security. Both the expansion of security-related fields and the arrangement

of national security in the Report suggest that the CCCPC is paying more and more

attention to non-traditional security issues, including non-traditional national security

issues, and that it puts the emphasis of its national security on domestic social security.

Because the concept of “overall national security outlook” had not been proposed at the

time, we can only call this security outlook the embryo, or the “factual existence,” of

the overall national security outlook rather than the birth, or the “conceptual existence”

of it.

The non-traditional overall security outlook did not come into “conceptual existence”

until President Xi Jinping brought forth the “Overall National Security Outlook” and

made systematic exposition of it in April 2014.

2. The ONSO Is a Comprehensive, Systematic, Advanced and

Non-traditional National Security Outlook

The ONSO is not just a non-traditional national security outlook; it is a complete,

comprehensive, systematic, advanced and non-traditional national security outlook.

Strictly speaking, any national security outlook, as long as it deals with nontraditional

national security issues, is regarded as a non-traditional national security

outlook. However, if it deals only with non-traditional national security issues but

pays no attention to or even excludes traditional national security issues, it can only

be called a partial and low-form non-traditional national security outlook. The “New

Security Concept” was once favored and advocated by China. If it can be called a nontraditional

national security outlook at the level of international security and external

security, it is merely a partial, low-form non-traditional national security outlook at the

level of national security. It is partial in the national security domain because it deals

only with external and international security and pays no attention to internal security.

Meanwhile, although the “New Security Concept” involves both non-traditional and

traditional elements in its composition, when it comes to security guarantees, it only

emphasizes the role of non-traditional measures and approaches and does not touch

upon and even deny the role of traditional measures and approaches in effect. It is,

therefore, a partial low-form non-traditional security outlook even in the domain of

international security. Only when a security outlook involves both non-traditional and

traditional elements in composition, threat, and a guarantee of security can it become

a comprehensive, advanced non-traditional security outlook. Only when a national

security outlook deals with traditional and non-traditional national security issues

completely, comprehensively, and systematically and makes dialectic observation and

treatment of them can it become a advanced non-traditional national security outlook in

a real sense; as the ONSO is.

The ONSO deals with both external and internal security issues and attaches special

130 LIU Yuejin

importance to internal security, thus integrating the external and internal aspects of

national security. It involves both the subjective pursuit and the objective situation in

national security. The subjective pursuit and practical requirements in the ONSO are

the results of careful observation and judgment of China’s national security reality.

In this way it accomplishes the unity of the subjective and the objective. Likewise, it

achieves the unity of the traditional and the non-traditional in the aspects of constituent

elements, threats, and guarantees of national security by dealing with both non-traditional

and traditional national security issues. Therefore, the ONSO has surpassed not only

traditional national security outlooks but also low-form non-traditional national security

outlooks, including the “New Security Concept” that China had been advocating over the

years.

The ONSO is an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. It is different

from both traditional national security outlooks and low-form non-traditional national

security outlooks. In order to grasp precisely the position of the ONSO in national

security history and its relationship with various national security outlooks, it is

necessary to classify the concept of “national security outlook” with logical methods.

With the result of this classifi cation we will be able to determine the position of the

ONSO and study its characteristics.

When we made special studies on classification of national security outlooks as

early as over a decade ago, we have come to the conclusion that neither the traditional

national security outlook nor the non-traditional security outlook (the then “New

National Security Concept”) is a unified system of thought and that they are two

categories of national security outlooks summarizing different national security

thoughts. In terms of a traditional national security outlook, we believe that “logically

speaking, traditional national security outlooks refer to those that had existed and

played important roles from the birth of countries to the end of the Cold War. It

includes various national security outlooks in state and international relations theories

since modern times on the one hand, such as national security outlooks in idealist

and realist theories, and ancient national security thoughts on the other, as evidenced

by ideas about national security in ancient Chinese Confucian, Taoist, Legalist, and

Military strategists’ thoughts as well as observations made by ancient Greek thinkers

like Plato and Aristotle.”9 Similarly, for non-traditional national security outlook, we

also made specific explanation under the term of “New National Security Concept”:

“The ‘New National Security Concept’ is not a national security outlook with neither

a unifi ed system of thought nor even a common concept; it is a name given to recently

proposed national security outlooks: ‘other-reference’ or ‘self-reference.’ ‘Otherreference’

means referring to ideas about recent national security that are proposed

by others or that arouse wide interest as ‘new national security outlook’.”10 For

9 Liu Yuejin, “On Classifi cation of National Security Concepts,” Journal of Jiangnan Social University, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23

(2001-4-22-23).

10 Liu Yuejin, “On Classifi cation of National Security Concepts,” Journal of Jiangnan Social University, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23

(2001-4-22-23).

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 131

instance, some researchers refer to thoughts about “common security” as a “common

security outlook,” the ideas about “comprehensive security” as a “comprehensive

security concept,” and ideas about “cooperative security” as a “cooperative security

concept.”11“‘Self-reference’ means referring to one’s own new national security houghts

as “new national security outlook.”12 For instance, Zhao Ying refers to what he proposes

in his book entitled A New National Security Concept as a “new national security

concept.”13Another example is the author of this paper’s reference to his own works:

“From methodological and theoretical points of view, national security is a complicated

social system and national security activities are complicated systems engineering.

Therefore it is necessary to adopt systematic approaches to study theoretical and

practical national security issues at different levels and establish a ‘systematic security

outlook’.”14 “The ‘Systematic Security Outlook’ can therefore be referred to as a ‘selfreferred’

‘new national security outlook’.”15 Now I would like to propose specifi cally

that “traditional national security outlook vs. non-traditional national security

outlook” and “traditional security outlook vs. non-traditional security outlook” are

two pairs of contradictory (not opposing) concepts derived from classifi cation of their

high concepts of “national security outlook” and “security outlook” with the logical

dichotomy method. In more logical terms, “traditional national security outlook” is

a positive concept whereas “non-traditional national security outlook” is a negative

concept in contradiction. Likewise, “traditional security outlook” is a positive concept

whereas “non-traditional security outlook” is a negative concept. Therefore, as far

as security outlook is concerned, there is no possibility for the existence of a third

outlook aside from traditional and non-traditional outlooks. In terms of national

security outlook, there is not a third national security outlook except for traditional

national security outlook and non-traditional national security outlook. Now that

traditional security outlook, non-traditional security outlook, traditional national

security outlook, and non-traditional national security outlook are all categorical names,

there will inevitably be various more specific security outlooks or national security

outlooks. If the “New Security Concept” put forth by the Chinese government at the

turn of the century is a specifi c non-traditional security outlook under the category of

“non-traditional security outlook,” then the “Overall National Security Outlook” is a

non-traditional national security outlook under the category of “non-traditional national

security outlook.”

11 Zhu Yangming, On Asia-Pacifi c Security Strategies, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2000, pp.131-135 (

2000-131-135 ).

12 Liu Yuejin, “On Classifi cation of National Security Concepts,” Journal of Jiangnan Social University, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23

(2001-4-22-23 ).

13 Zhao Ying, A New National Security Concept—Confrontation and Choice beyond War, Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing

House, 1992, pp.476-478 (__________1992

476-478).

14 Liu Yuejin, “Systematic Security Concept and Its Three Levels,” Journal of University of International Relations, No.2 (2001),

pp.3-9 (2001-2 - 3-9).

15 Liu Yuejin, “On Classifi cation of National Security Concepts,” Journal of Jiangnan Social University, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23

(2001-4-22-23).

132 LIU Yuejin

As the aim of this paper is to analyze the ONSO, the following discussion will

be limited to “national security outlook” instead of the more general “security

outlook.” Strictly speaking, the ONSO is a “national security outlook” with national

security as its specifi c subject; it is not a general “security outlook” whose subject

is uncertain and drifts around. Because we call the ONSO an advanced-form nontraditional

national security outlook, this paper will talk about such concepts as

“traditional national security outlook” vs. “non-traditional national security outlook”

and “advanced-form non-traditional national security outlook” vs. “low-form nontraditional

national security outlook.” If traditional national security concepts refer to

national security outlooks in both history and practice that overplay the importance

of military forces, politics, territory, and sovereignty but neglect and even deny the

signifi cant roles that non-traditional factors such as culture, science and technology,

and ecology play in the domain of national security; then non-traditional national

security concepts are those that recognize or stress to different extents the important

roles non-traditional factors such as culture, science and technology, and ecology

play in the same domain. In the same manner, low-form non-traditional national

security outlooks refer to those national security outlooks that overplay the nontraditional

but neglect and even deny the traditional elements in the national security

domain whereas advanced non-traditional national security outlooks are those that

taken into consideration both the traditional and the non-traditional in the same

domain. It becomes obvious that the difference in understanding traditional and nontraditional

national security issues is where the difference between traditional and

non-traditional national security outlooks lies; so is the difference between the lowform

and advanced non-traditional national security outlooks. Their relationships can

be illustrated by Figure 2.

Figure 2 Relations between National Security Outlooks and Issues

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 133

According to Figure 2, traditional national security outlook is merely the refl ection

of traditional national security issues whereas the non-traditional one can be a mere

refl ection of non-traditional national security issues or refl ection of both traditional and

non-traditional national security issues. It is natural and necessary for non-traditional

national security outlook to refl ect non-traditional national security issues. Otherwise

it would not be called a non-traditional national security outlook. However, it does not

necessarily refl ect traditional national security issues as this would not change its nontraditional

nature. The difference is that when a non-traditional national security outlook

only reflects non-traditional national security issues, it is a low-form non-traditional

national security outlook; when it strikes a balance between non-traditional and

traditional national security issues and deals with them from a holistic point of view,

it becomes an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. The non-traditional

national security outlook, therefore, includes low-form non-traditional national security

outlook and advanced non-traditional national security outlook. The former is merely

a refl ection of non-traditional national security issues whereas the latter is the balanced

and comprehensive refl ection of both non-traditional and traditional national security

issues. The ONSO is exactly an advanced non-traditional national security outlook

which comprehensively refl ects both non-traditional and traditional national security

issues.

Obviously, the dividing line between advanced non-traditional national security

outlook and low-form non-traditional national security outlook is whether the outlook

deals with and emphasizes traditional national security issues while dealing with and

emphasizing non-traditional security issues. The ONSO is called advanced and nontraditional

mainly because it deals with and emphasizes both non-traditional and

traditional national security issues and balances them from a holistic perspective. It is,

therefore, different from the traditional national security outlook which deals only with

traditional national security issues but neglects non-traditional national security issues

and from the low-form non-traditional national security outlook which focuses on the

non-traditional but ignores the traditional. The ONSO is best exemplified when Xi

Jinping stresses that “We must attach importance to both traditional and non-traditional

security.” In order to make an in-depth analysis of the advanced non-traditional security

thinking in the ONSO, it is necessary to quote the whole statement: “We must attach

importance to both traditional and non-traditional security and build a national security

system that covers the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society,

science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources.”16 The

eleven aspects of security mentioned in this statement are in fact constituent elements of

contemporary national security. In other words, as far as constituent elements of national

security are concerned, the ONSO integrates traditional and non-traditional national

security elements by means of advanced non-traditional national security thinking. Xi

16 Xi Jinping, “Adhere to An Overall National Security Outlook and Explore a National Security Path with Chinese

Characteristics,” Xinhua (), http://news.xinhuanet.

com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm.

134 LIU Yuejin

Jinping does not make a distinction between traditional and non-traditional national

security elements in his statement. But according to our studies over the past decade,

it is evident that the statement stresses that we must pay attention to both traditional

national security elements such as political security, territorial security, military security,

economic security, social security and resource security and non-traditional national

security elements such as cultural security, science and technology security, information

security, ecological security and nuclear security and make balanced and holistic

consideration of these traditional and non-traditional elements.

It should be quite safe to classify political, territorial, and military security as

traditional national security components. But it would cause quite a few raised

eyebrows among certain security and national security researchers to add economic,

social, and resource security to the traditional national security components. While

they agree that these security elements are only emphasized by non-traditional national

security outlooks, they consciously or unconsciously regard them as non-traditional

elements. But such an understanding is incorrect, as it confuses subjective cognition

with objective reality and fails to realize that objective things have long existed before

they are known. There are such elements in the domain of national security. These

elements attract the attention of subsequent non-traditional national security outlooks,

but in fact they have existed for a very long time in national security history. Such

national security elements include economic, social and resource security. Attention

to and emphasis on these traditional elements are not realized in traditional national

security outlooks but in non-traditional national security outlooks. Any national

security outlook that pays attention to and stresses these components is not traditional

but non-traditional. The ONSO’s attention to and emphasis on these traditional national

security elements, like its attention to and emphasis on non-traditional elements such

as culture, science and technology, information, and ecology security, embodies nontraditional

national security thinking. The ONSO lays stress on traditional and nontraditional

elements which are only emphasized by non-traditional security outlooks

on the one hand and attaches importance to traditional elements such as political,

territory, and military security which have long been emphasized by traditional national

security outlooks on the other. This dual emphasis makes it possible for the ONSO to

integrate all of these elements into one single national security system and progress to

an advanced non-traditional national security outlook.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that although only eleven national security

elements are mentioned above, Xi Jinping actually included more elements in his

exposition of the ONSO. Prior to the “traditional security and non-traditional security”

statement, he mentioned a very important national security element, “people’s safety”

in his “attaching importance to both territorial security and people’s safety” statement.

Therefore, counting the “people’s safety” element, the national security system the

ONSO tries to build comprises not eleven but twelve national security components. It

is a system made up of all national security issues discussed in the ONSO instead of

any single national security constituent element. Actually the ONSO’s emphasis on

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 135

“attaching importance to people’s safety” alone embodies advanced non-traditional

national security thinking. Although people’s safety is a traditional national security

element, like economic security, it does not receive much attention in traditional

national security outlooks. In the domain of national security, any national security

thinking that stresses the traditional element of safety of the people is not traditional but

non-traditional; any national security outlook that is characterized by people-oriented

or people-centered ideas and concepts is not traditional but non-traditional. It is not

an ordinary non-traditional national security outlook; it is an advanced non-traditional

national security outlook. The advanced and non-traditional qualities of the OSNO

lie not only in its integrated consideration of traditional and non-traditional national

security elements but also in its special emphasis on the signifi cance of people’s safety

as its main mission and ultimate goal. When Xi Jinping underlines two traditional

national security components — “territorial security” and “people’s safety” through

the statement that “We must value both territorial security and people’s safety, follow

the people-foremost and people-oriented guideline, do all national security work for

the people, rally support from the people, and effectively strengthen the mass basis of

national security,” he adopts non-traditional national security thinking to emphasize the

latter. To better understand this statement, it is necessary to point out that “traditional

national security outlook and non-traditional national security outlook” as a pair of

contradictory concepts in the subjective cognition fi eld are different from “traditional

national security elements and non-traditional national security elements” as a pair of

contradictory concepts in the objective social fi eld. “The people’s safety” by nature is

a traditional national security element, but it was not given adequate attention in the

traditional national security outlook. It is only in a non-traditional national security

outlook, especially an advanced non-traditional national security outlook like the

ONSO that it gets the attention it deserves. “People’s safety” is considered a traditional

national security element because people are an indispensable basic component of any

country and people’s safety is an indispensable basic component of national security,

no matter the development stages of human society, the types of states in which people

live and the place they have in any particular development stage or country. According

to national security theories, people’s safety is the “native element” of national security

instead of its “derived element.” For this reason, people’s safety must have been a

traditional element in the field of national security; it could not be a non-traditional

element that came into being more recently. But traditional national security outlooks

have not attached due importance to the people of the country or their safety. They are

recognized and emphasized only by non-traditional national security outlooks, especially

by such advanced non-traditional national security outlooks as the ONSO.

The importance attached to people’s safety is shown in two similar terms used in Xi

Jinping’s statements about the ONSO: “people’s safety” and “safety of the people.”

The former has a strong connection with the “people foremost thought” in traditional

Chinese culture and the latter is closely related to the classic Mass View of Marxism.

Xi highlights people’s safety by juxtaposing it with territorial security and stresses the

136 LIU Yuejin

special signifi cance of safety of the people as the main mission of national security by

comparing it with political, economic, military, cultural, and social security. He points

out that we “must adhere to the Overall National Security Outlook, take safety of the

people as its main mission, political security as its basic task, economic security as

its foundation, military, cultural and social security as its guarantee, and promotion of

international security as its support, and explore a national security path with Chinese

characteristics.”17 Despite their different names, “safety of the people” and “people’s

safety” basically refer to the same thing in the domain of national security, that is, the

safety of the people in the country. Based on analysis of Xi Jinping’s statements about

safety of the people and public safety, we come to the following interpretation: “taking

safety of the people as its main mission” is the general program of national security in

present-day China; the emphasis on “people-foremost and people-oriented guideline”

has connection with traditional Chinese culture and civilization of the whole human

kind and points out the fundamental role of people in people-government relations and

the kernel position of human beings in the relations between humans and things; “doing

every national security work for the people” not only indicates the central place that

safety of the people or people’s safety possess among all national security components

but also suggests that it is the ultimate goal of all national security activities and most

important of all highlights the people’s subjective status in the whole national security

system; “rallying support for national security from the people” follows the CPC’s

Mass Line tradition and contains the fundamental policy of “from the masses and to

the masses” in national security work; and “effectively strengthening the mass basis of

national security” is a general requirement that national security work must rely on the

support from the people. In this way, the ONSO has applied the CPC’s main mission of

“serving the people” and “governance for the people” principle to national security work

and is indeed a heart-winning national security design and project.18 This feature further

enhances the ONSO’s status and strengthens its standing as an advanced non-traditional

national security outlook.

In addition to its dual and integrated attention to both traditional and non-traditional

elements and its emphasis on safety of the people in orientation, the ONSO, as

an advanced non-traditional national security outlook, is an outlook that not only

highlights the comprehensive, holistic, and systematic nature of national security in

theory but also incorporates various national security elements in practice and has

developed into a comprehensive, overall, and systematic national security outlook. 1920

17 Xi Jinping, “Adhere to An Overall National Security Outlook and Explore a National Security Path with Chinese

Characteristics,” Xinhua ( ), http://news.xinhuanet.

com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm.

18 Liu Yuejin, “Overall National Security Outlook: Public Foundation and Theoretical Origin,” The People Forum, No. 16 (2014),

p. 25 ( ONSO 2014 16 25 ).

19 Liu Yuejin, “Overall National Security Outlook in the Grand Security Age on the Philosophical Thoughts in Xi Jinping’s

Major National Security-Related Speeches,” Beijing Daily, May 19, 2014 (

ONSO 2014 5 19 ).

20 Liu Yuejin, “On the Five ‘Overalls’ in the Overall National Security Outlook,” The People Forum (Academic Frontiers), No.17 (2014),

pp. 14-20 (ONSO·2014 17 14-20).

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 137

3. The ONSO Consists of Rich Non-Traditional National Security Contents

Any non-traditional national security outlook, whether an advanced one which deals

with both non-traditional and traditional issues, or a low-form non-traditional one

which deals only with non-traditional issues, will put forward and stress non-traditional

national security issues to different degrees. As an advanced non-traditional national

security outlook, the ONSO not only deals with traditional national security issues but

also pays attention to and highlights various non-traditional national security issues and

turns them into rich non-traditional national security contents in the ONSO.

First of all, as far as national security composition is concerned, the ONSO deals

with and highlights a large number of non-traditional security elements, which is

exemplifi ed by the fi ve non-traditional national security elements, i.e. culture, science

and technology, information, nuclear security among the eleven security elements

mentioned in Xi Jinping’s remark of “attaching importance to both traditional and nontraditional

security.”

Of the fi ve non-traditional national security elements, cultural security and science

and technology security came into existence relatively early, emerging approximately

in modern times. But because they did not play any major role in modern traditional

national security practice, they are not considered traditional national security elements

in modern times. Obviously, cultural security and science and technology security do

not belong to traditional national security elements, not because they were overlooked

in traditional national security outlook (in fact they were), but because they played an

insignifi cant role in traditional national security practice. As both derived elements and

newborn elements of national security, information security and ecological security are

the most obvious non-traditional national security elements. As for nuclear security,

obviously it is a non-traditional national security element. But it is not a first-class

national security element like culture, science and technology, information, and ecology

security; it is a third-class element under the traditional military and resource security

categories and the non-traditional science and technology security category. Under the

category of military security, nuclear security is a constituent element of weaponry

and equipment security and a nuclear weapon security issue; under the resource

security category, it is a constituent element of nuclear resource and a nuclear resource

security issue; under the science and technology category, it is a constituent element of

technological application security and a nuclear application security issue.

Such analysis of nuclear security brings forth a new question: if nuclear security is a

non-traditional national security element, then why is it under the traditional categories

of military security and resource security? Indeed this is an example of the complicated

relationship between traditional national security and non-traditional security. It is

likely that there are some non-traditional elements among the second or third-class

elements under the category of a particular traditional national security element.

Likewise, it is likely that there are some traditional elements among the second or

third-class elements under the category of a particular non-traditional national security

138 LIU Yuejin

element. The incorporation of traditional nuclear weapon security under the traditional

military security element category is a case in point; so is the non-traditional nuclear

resource security under the traditional resource security element category. Of course,

it is possible that there are traditional national security elements under certain nontraditional

security element categories. For instance, there is the traditional national

secret security issue under the non-traditional information security category. This

suggests the complicated overlap and interpenetration between traditional and nontraditional

national security elements.

Therefore, there may be more non-traditional national security elements in the ONSO

in addition to cultural security, science and technology security, information security,

ecological security and nuclear security. It is very likely that there are more second and

third-class non-traditional elements within traditional national security elements such

as safety of the people, political security, territorial security, military security, economic

security, social security, and resource security. Not all of these non-traditional national

security elements are listed in President Xi’s remarks about the ONSO. But we must

reveal each and every one of them if we are to conduct an in-depth study of the ONSO.

It will enable us to deepen our understanding of the non-traditional quality of the

ONSO and probe further into the diversity, multi-polarity, complexity, and richness of

these non-traditional national security elements.

Secondly, in terms of the environment of national security, the ONSO involves many

contributory factors and threats to national security, the most important of which is a

non-traditional element: terrorism.

In his exposition of the ONSO on April 15, 2014, Xi Jinping did not use expressions

like “environment of national security” or “contributory factors and threats of national

security.” But the appeal to “enhance adversity consciousness and exercise vigilance

in peace time” indicates that there are worries and troubles in present-day Chinese

national security. The “elements” in “unprecedented complicated internal and external

elements” refer to national security threats, in other words, domestic worries and

external troubles. Arguments like “development is the foundation of security” and “only

a prosperous country can have a strong military” explain the infl uence of development

and wealth on national security.

On an early occasion, President Xi Jinping made direct reference to “noticeable

increase in predictable and unpredictable risks” when expounding the necessity of

the founding of the National Security Commission at the 3rd plenary session of the

18th NCCPC in November 2013.21 This was, in effect, classifi cation of the threats to

national security from the “predictable/unpredictable” dimension. In fact, since the 16th

NCCPC, there has been another kind of categorization of national security threats, i.e.,

“traditional/non-traditional security threats.” Such categorization was frequently seen

in the 16th NCCPC Report, Resolutions of the 4th and 6th Plenary Sessions of the 16th

21 Xi Jinping, “Explanatory Notes for ‘the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major

Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’,” Xinhua (

), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm.

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 139

CCCPC, the 17th and 18th NCCPC Reports and other important documents concerning

national security and is considered an effective approach in categorizing threats

of national security even to this day. Thus there are three kinds of classification of

national security threats: the internal/external perspective, the predictable/unpredictable

dimension, and the traditional/non-traditional approach. The application of the three

classifi cation methods depends on particular cases. When we come to this issue in our

studies of national security theories over the years, we usually adopt the natural/social

and internal/external classifi cation methods.

After proposing the ONSO, Xi Jinping made a special speech on national security at

the 14th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee

on April 25, 2015. He pointed out that “in the new situation, our country’s national

security and social stability are facing growing threats and challenges and the coupling

effect between the threats and challenges are especially noticeable.”22 The “threats

and challenges” twice mentioned here refer to various elements jeopardizing national

security. Xi also talked about the fi ght against terrorism in his speech, reiterating that

“violent terrorist activities show no regard for fundamental human rights, trample

on humanity and justice and challenge the very bottom line of human civilization.

Violent terrorism is not an ethnic or religious issue but the common enemy of people

of all ethnic groups.” He pointed out the country must “resolutely suppress and strike

hard at separatist, infiltrative, and sabotage activities of external and internal hostile

forces on the pretext of ethnic issues.” Obviously, terrorism, hostile forces, separatism,

infi ltration, and sabotage are all elements posing immediate threat and harm to national

security. It is arguable to some people that the hostile forces, separatism, infiltration

and sabotage mentioned here are traditional elements endangering national security

and that only terrorism is a non-traditional one. But the majority of the elements

embodied in various social and political endeavors to “maintain national security”

are non-traditional. In fact there are many social elements, especially non-traditional

elements, in the speech. Specifi cally speaking, Xi urges governments at different levels

to “hold high the banner of national unity” and “strengthen and improve leadership of

grassroots Party organizations and governments and engage in careful and thorough

work for the people.” “Grassroots authorities must properly use ethnic and religious

policies to handle conflicts that affect ethnic unity,” “maintain social harmony and

stability,” “prevent and solve social conflicts,” “make earnest efforts to achieve

comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development,” “safeguard and improve

people’s livelihood,” “promote social fairness and justice and enhance the well-being of

the people,” “coordinate interests of all parties,” “make sure the fruits of development

benefit all people still more and equally,” “uphold the people’s legal rights and

interests,” and so on.

However, all contributory factors and threats to national security, whether they

22 “Effectively Safeguard National Security and Social Stability and Create Favorable Social Environment for Accomplishment

of Objectives,” The People ( ), http://

politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0427/c1024-24946690.html.

140 LIU Yuejin

are traditional or non-traditional, are contents that the ONSO should involve and

incorporate. It is necessary to use the theoretical analysis framework of national

security developed over the years to analyze the contributory factors and threats of

national security that the ONSO directly or indirectly involves and those it should.

According to theoretical studies in national security over the years, we think

contributory factors and threats of national security can be classifi ed from the natural/

social and the domestic/external aspects. From the natural/social dimension, natural

contributory factors of national security include mainly national territorial area,

geographic location, natural resources, climate, and population; the social elements can

be further classifi ed as domestic and external elements. The domestic elements consists

of the state system, cardinal policy, quality of citizen, ethnic and religious issues and

so on; the external elements mainly includes the theme of the times, world structure,

international order and relations with neighboring countries. Figure 3 gives a brief

description of these elements.

Threats to national security can also be divided into two groups: natural elements

(natural calamities) and social elements (man-made disasters). The former includes

flood, waterlogging, drought, earthquake, insect plague, epidemic, windstorm and

fire; the latter can be further divided into internal elements (domestic troubles) and

external elements (foreign aggression). Internal elements include civil war, domestic

turmoil, separatism, sabotage, extremism, and domestic terrorism; external elements

Figure 3 Contributory Factors of National Security

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 141

include military invasion, political subversion, cultural infiltration, covert operation,

and international terrorism and so on. Figure 4 gives a brief description of the threats of

national security.

Figure 4 Threats to National Security

Of the elements listed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, some are traditional security

elements, some are non-traditional security elements. The latter deserves more attention

and study in understanding the ONSO. Among the contributory factors and threats to

national security, natural resources and population are non-traditional natural elements

to a great extent; nationality, religion, and theme of the times are mainly non-traditional

social elements. Among the elements endangering national security, natural disasters

are basically traditional elements, so are most man-made calamities. Only international

terrorism and domestic terrorism are relatively apparent non-traditional elements.

Separatism and extremism, although often treated as non-traditional elements, are

traditional elements with quite a long history and have done serious harm.

These contributory factors and threats to national security were not mentioned in Xi

Jinping’s speech expounding the ONSO on April 15, 2015. In his speech delivered at

the collective study session of CCCPC Politburo on April 25, Xi made a list of national

security elements, such as terrorism, hostile forces, separatism, infi ltration, sabotage,

nationality, religion, the mass, social confl icts, people’s livelihoods, justice and so on,

142 LIU Yuejin

some of which are shown in the Figures and some are not. Nonetheless, many elements

are indeed in both Xi’s speech on April 25 and the two Figures, including traditional

security elements that endanger national security, such as terrorism, separatism,

sabotage and infiltration, and non-traditional security elements that affect national

security, such as nationality and religion. In order to fully understand and make indepth

study of the elements that affect and endanger national security, including

both traditional and non-traditional elements, we must try to take into consideration

various elements and make them organic components of the ONSO when we study and

implement the ONSO.

Finally, because the maintenance and guarantee of national security is key to the

ONSO, it discusses various measures to maintain and guarantee national security,

including large amounts of non-traditional national security guarantee measures with

strategic signifi cance.

As traditional national security attaches special importance to political security and

political power security, it relies heavily on military offence and defense and political

suppression in safeguarding national security. In contrast, non-traditional security

outlooks, be they non-traditional international security concepts, non-traditional

national security outlooks, or non-traditional general security outlooks, all emphasize

the important roles of non-traditional measures and approaches, often at the expense

of neglecting or even denying the roles of traditional measures and approaches. Unlike

various low-form non-traditional security outlooks with lopsided emphasis on nontraditional

measures, the ONSO, as an advanced non-traditional national security

outlook, balances both traditional and non-traditional measures and approaches and

emphasizes the fundamental role of the latter.

In our studies of national security theories for over ten years, we have developed

a system to classify national security guarantee measures and approaches. First the

guarantee of national security is divided into guarantee mechanism and activities. Then

the former is further divided into the hardware and the software, the latter is further

divided into hard measures and soft measures. The concrete measures and approaches

are list according to the classifi cations (See Figure 5).

As illustrated by Figure 5, the software of national security safeguarding mechanism

consists of law (the legal system of national security), system (national security

system), concept (national security outlook), strategy (national security strategy),

policy (national security policy), management (national security management), will

of the people (popular support), democracy (building of democratic politics) and so

on; the hardware of national security safeguard mechanism comprises military forces,

political organs, intelligence agencies, economy and trade, culture and education,

diplomatic organs and foreign affairs departments. Accordingly, the operations of the

former include economic development, national security publicity and public relations,

national security education, political and social reform and innovation, diplomatic and

foreign-related activities; whereas the operations of the latter include military offence

and defense, political suppression, intelligence and security, imprisonment and exile

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 143

Figure 5 National Security Guarantee Mechanism

and so on.

It is obvious that the categorization and listing of national security safeguarding

mechanisms in Figure 5 are not conducted from the traditional/non-traditional tag

but from the mechanism/operation and hardware/software perspectives, with both

traditional and non-traditional contents in each category.

The emphasis of the ONSO and President Xi Jinping’s remarks on national security

is on neither the components of national security nor the contributory factors and

threats of national security. Instead, the emphasis is on the maintenance and guarantee

of national security. But it does not attempt to classify the national security issues

according to the traditional/non-traditional perspective; seldom does it make rigid

classifi cation of national security measures and approaches. The argument in the ONSO

is developed mainly according to the logical order in practical work.

In order to show that the emphasis of President Xi Jinping’s arguments concerning

the ONSO is put on the maintenance and guarantee of national security, that these

arguments do not classify issues of national security guarantee from the traditional/

non-traditional dimension, and that these issues of national security maintenance

and guarantee include both traditional and non-traditional measures and approaches,

the paper will make an in-depth analysis in sequential order of the main paragraphs

of President Xi’s speech while chairing the first meeting of the National Security

Commission on April 15, 2015.

First, the speech stresses that “we must accurately grasp new features and tendencies

in changes in national security situation, adhere to an overall national security outlook

and explore a national security path with Chinese characteristics.” These are new

general requirements in maintaining and safeguarding national security that are both

traditional and non-traditional. The requirement that “we accurately grasp new features

and tendencies in changes in national security situation” is a common and traditional

144 LIU Yuejin

practice in the work of the Party, government and army, as it is in the fi eld of national

security. However, the requirement that we must “adhere to an overall national security

outlook” is a brand new non-traditional measure in national security and serves as a

guiding principle in China’s national security work. There is no difference between the

speech’s stress on “Chinese characteristics” in exploring a national security path and

the emphasis put on “Chinese characteristics” in other fi elds. However, compared with

the practice of other countries in their national security work and that of China’s in the

past, the application of this general principle to the fi eld of national security is quite

new and strongly non-traditional and is therefore an important non-traditional national

security guarantee measure.

Second, the “adversity consciousness” and “vigilance in peace time” in the

speech are important ideas in traditional Chinese national security thoughts. Taking

“enhancing adversity consciousness and exercising vigilance in peace time” as a “major

principle” in running the Party and the country means taking it as a major principle

in safeguarding national security. To the Chinese, such a principle is undoubtedly a

traditional way of thinking and approach to safeguarding national security.

Third, the speech points out that the purpose of establishing the National Security

Committee (NSC) is to “better adapt to the new national security situation and new

tasks of our country, build a centralized, unified, efficient and authoritative national

security system so as to strengthen the leadership of national security work.” It is a

common practice to establish organizations and set up effi cient mechanisms to ensure

national security. But for China, considering its relatively weak efforts in this regard, it

is more or less non-traditional.

Fourth, the speech puts forth a series of guidelines in national security work: “taking

safety of the people as its main mission, political security as its basic task, economic

security as its foundation, military, cultural and social security as its guarantee, and

promotion of international security as its support.” Among these guidelines, “taking

political security as its basic task” and “taking military security as its guarantee” are

obvious traditional security measures. The rest of the guidelines are all crucial nontraditional

measures and approaches to safeguarding national security in present-day

China. Note that “taking safety of the people as its main mission” does not mean it is

up to the people to safeguard national security. Instead, it means that the ultimate goal

of safeguarding national security is to safeguard the people’s safety and interests. This

is a new national security philosophy with remarkable non-traditional features and

constitutes the fundamental principle of contemporary Chinese national security work.

Fifth, the speech declares that China will “attach importance to both domestic and

external security. Domestically, it will pursue development, reform, and stability and

foster a safe environment; externally, the country will seek peace, cooperation, a winwin

situation and a harmonious world.” This declaration classifies national security

guarantee measures into domestic and external measures and makes a list of specifi c

measures and approaches. Among these measures and approaches, only the “pursuit

of peace” can be regarded as a traditional national security guarantee measure for its

Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook 145

traditional feature. In comparison, the pursuit of “development, reform, stability,” “safe

environment,” “cooperation,” “win-win situation,” and “harmonious world” are all

non-traditional national security guarantee measures and approaches.

Sixth, the speech stresses that China “must value both territorial security and the

safety of its people, follow the people-foremost and people-oriented guideline, rally

support from the people, and effectively strengthen the mass basis of national security.”

Such a statement displays remarkable non-traditional features. The measures and

approaches mentioned here, including “following the people-foremost and peopleoriented

guideline,” “rallying support from the people,” and “strengthening the mass

basis,” seem to be traditional, for they either reflect traditional Chinese history and

culture or model themselves on the traditional mission and work methods of the CPC.

But in the fi eld of national security, they are non-traditional guarantee measures and

approaches to national security.

Seventh, the speech reiterates that China “must attach importance to both traditional

security and non-traditional security and build a unifi ed national security system that

covers the spheres of politics, territory, the military, economy, culture, society, science

and technology, information, ecology, nuclear and natural resources.” Here the security

in these eleven fi elds should be considered as components of national security rather

than guarantee measures of national security. When these components are assembled to

“build a unifi ed national security system,” they are in fact the targets or objectives of

national security guarantees. This demonstrates not only traditional security thinking

but also a large measure of non-traditional security characters.

Eighth, although the speech centers on national security, it associates security with

development and calls for “attaching importance to both development and security,”

pointing out that “development is the foundation of security, which is the pre-condition

of development. Only a prosperous country can have a strong military, which in turn

can protect the country.” This demonstrates dialectic non-traditional security thinking.

The statement about the signifi cance of development for national security suggests that

all-round development is an important force in national security guarantee. Moreover,

it is a non-traditional guarantee of national security.

Ninth, in addition to linking security with development, the speech connects China’s

own national security with other countries’ national security and international security,

thus endowing the ONSO with a broad international outlook and epochal features.

Such open-mindedness in security provides a non-traditional approach to guaranteeing

national security. “China will not only pay attention to its own security, but also to

common security. China will seek to form a community of common destiny and

promote all parties involved to seek mutual benefi t, interests and common security.”

Here along with the aforementioned “reliance on international security,” the goal of

“common security,” the forging of “a community of common destiny,” and the pursuit

of “mutual benefi t and interests,” are all important non-traditional ideas and measures

meant to safeguard China’s national security in connection with other countries’

security and international security.

146 LIU Yuejin

Tenth, “The National Security Commission should follow the principles of

centralized and unifi ed leadership and scientifi c planning and concentrate concerted and

result-oriented efforts on issues of priority in national security work.” This statement is

about the work principles and concrete methods of the National Security Commission.

These principles and methods, if applied to national security and put in comparison

with other countries’ national security activities and China’s national security work in

the past, display unprecedented non-traditional qualities in many aspects.

It is customary nowadays to classify national security issues as traditional and nontraditional.

It is true that underlining “non-traditional” would lend more “novel”

elements to national security work and research. But such non-traditionalism for

non-traditionalism’s sake would inevitably bring on negative effects to national

security work and research. Although the ONSO discusses the difference between

the traditional and the non-traditional and calls for integrated treatment of the two at

certain points, it does not attempt to rigidly and mechanically classify everything in

the whole national security domain as “traditional” and “non-traditional.” In addition

to appropriate traditional/non-traditional classification, the ONSO is flexible enough

to adopt the internal/external classification or enumerate issues in order of priority,

integrating the traditional and the non-traditional into overall national security issues

and argumentation. The ONSO thus becomes a non-traditional national security

outlook. But it is not a low-form non-traditional national security outlook; it is an

advanced non-traditional national security outlook that integrates the traditional and the

non-traditional. Non-traditional national security issues are addressed in the ONSO; as

are traditional national security issues. The ONSO does not ignore traditional national

security issues when talking about rich non-traditional national security issues. The

focuses of attention in this article are the non-traditional qualities and contents of the

ONSO, because these non-traditional national security issues dominate current national

security in the country and demand primary attention and prompt solutions if the

ONSO is to be put into practice. The ONSO is “non-traditional” because it concerns

and highlights various non-traditional national security issues; it is “overall” because

it pays dual attention to and makes overall planning for both traditional and nontraditional

national security issues; and it is “advanced” because it integrates traditional

and non-traditional national security issues through non-traditional thinking. It is

true that we should pay attention to traditional national security issues outlined in the

ONSO, but we should attach more importance to non-traditional national security issues.

While developing a holistic understanding of the statements about traditional and nontraditional

security issues outlined in the ONSO, we must focus our study especially on

the non-traditional contents that have been long neglected in the past. More importantly,

attention should be paid to the non-traditional security thinking in the ONSO.

Translator: Qi Hongbin (International Exchange and Cooperation Division,

University of International Relations, China)

Reviewers: Patrick Burton and Wang Wenhua

 

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