

# Non-Traditional Overall National Security Outlook

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**Abstract:** The “New Security Concept” put forward by the Chinese authorities at the turn of the century, with “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination” at its core, dealt mainly with non-traditional security approaches and measures in external security. However, it did not touch upon internal security or other traditional or non-traditional security issues in a broader sense. Therefore it is a low form of non-traditional security outlook and a low form of non-traditional national security outlook. When reviewing overall national security issues besides external security and international security, China has stuck to a traditional national security outlook. In comparison, taking “the people’s security as its aim,” the Overall National Security Outlook (ONSO) embodies non-traditional thinking and “attaches importance to both traditional and non-traditional security.” It is, therefore, an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. Though incorporating rich non-traditional national security issues, the ONSO deals with various traditional national security issues, as well. The ONSO is non-traditional in that it handles and highlights non-traditional national security issues; it is holistic because it pays dual attention to both traditional and non-traditional national security issues; it is advanced as it incorporates both traditional and non-traditional national security issues by means of non-traditional thinking.

**Keywords:** overall national security outlook, non-traditional national security outlook, non-traditional national security issues

## 1. From the “New Security Concept” to the “Overall National Security Outlook”

The Overall National Security Concept put forth by Xi Jinping, the Communist Party

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of China (CPC) General Secretary in April 2014 is considered a natural outcome of the long-term exploration of the national security concept and pattern by the CPC Central Committee and China's central government.

The main goals of the CPC since its establishment have been to find a road to rebirth and rescue the country and its people from poverty and weakness, from external humiliation and civil strife, in effect for the nation's security. Although the concept of "national security" did not exist at the establishment of the CPC, its political goals and practical work were all centered on a major issue that had been on the mind of Chinese pioneers since modern times: finding ways to rid itself of foreign invasion and the humiliation imposed on the Chinese nation by eastern and western powers, as well as the exploitation and oppression inflicted on its poor people by feudal forces within the country. The anti-imperial and anti-feudal guidelines and goals are in fact the reflection of such a national security objective.

The term "security" was first used in an important CPC document in 1945 in a report Mao made at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC). In this report entitled "On Coalition Government," which was later included in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Mao pointed out in the 10<sup>th</sup> question — "Diplomatic Issues": "About the establishment of an international institution for peace and security, the CPC agrees completely to the proposal made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and other related decisions reached at the Crimea Conference."<sup>1</sup> The "international institution of peace and security" here referred to the subsequent United Nations.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the term "security" was frequently used in fields like agricultural and industrial production and people's life. Expressions like "our country's security," "the country's security," and "our motherland's security" were often used to convey the idea of "national security"; just as expressions such as "preparing for war," "safeguarding the motherland," "strengthening combat readiness" and "taking class struggle as a guiding principle" were used to talk about maintaining and safeguarding national security. However, the term "national security" was not used specifically until 1983. Such national security theories and practices without the term "national security" could be called "factual description and practice of national security" in contrast to the "conceptual description and practice of national security" built up since the first use of "national security" in official documents in 1983.

The term "national security" appeared in China's official documents in 1983 for the first time. Its initial appearance in Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) documents was in 1986. The Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC) on June 6th, 1983 stated: "In order to ensure national security and strengthen counter espionage efforts, the State Council proposes that the Congress approves the establishment of

1 Mao Zedong, "On Coalition Government," Database of National Congresses of Communist Party of China, The People (毛泽东:《论联合政府》, 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库, 人民网), <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64559/4526988.html>.

the Ministry of State Security to strengthen the leadership of national security.” Three years later, the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles of Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CCCPC in September 1986 required the country’s citizens to “stand up and fight bravely when national security is under threat or social public security is in danger.”<sup>2</sup>

From then on, the term “national security” wasn’t seen in important CCCPC documents until the 9th Plenary Session of the 13th CCCPC in 1992, but appeared many times in work reports of the central government submitted to the NPC. For instance, “national security” appeared twice in the government work report to the First Session of the Seventh NPC in 1988: one was in “combat espionage activities against national security”; the other in “peoples in South African countries safeguard national security.” It appeared twice in the government work report to the Second Session of the Seventh NPC in 1989 and once in the government work report to the Fifth Session of the Seventh NPC in 1992. Especially since the 14th NCCPC in 1992, as the term began to appear more frequently in official documents of the government and the Party, the “conceptual description and practice of national security” evolved into a normal state.

Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities’ understanding of national security before the early 1990s was confined to traditional national security issues. Therefore, it is a quite traditional national security outlook. To take the report of the 14th NCCPC in 1992 as an example, all statements about national security, even any statement with the term “security,” were seen only in the chapter “Construction of the Armed Forces.” It was in the section of “strengthening military construction and national defense capabilities to ensure smooth development of reform and opening-up and economic construction” that the term “security” appeared 4 times, including a “national security”:

We must adhere unswervingly to the Party’s absolute leadership over the army, uphold Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts about army construction in the new period, follow the road of few but better troops with Chinese characteristics, build the People’s Liberation Army into a powerful, modernized, and regularized revolutionary army, and keep reinforcing our country’s national defense capacities so as to provide a strong guarantee for reform and opening-up and economic construction. After the disarmament of one million troops, the Army should adapt itself to the requirements of modern warfare in the future, attach importance to quality construction, comprehensively enhance its combat effectiveness so as to better accomplish its sacred mission of protecting territorial land, airspace, naval sovereignty as well as marine rights and interests and defending our motherland’s unity and security.

2 Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles of Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization (Adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 28, 1986), *The People* (《中共中央关于社会主义精神文明建设指导方针的决议》(中国共产党第十二届中央委员会第六次全体会议1986年9月28日通过), 人民网), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5104/5201/20010429/455518.html>.

Meanwhile, the Army should consciously submit itself to the overall goal of national economic construction, actively support and participate in reform and opening-up and modernization efforts and contribute to the country's development and prosperity...We must keep reinforcing the construction of the People's Armed Police Forces, public security and national security forces to better maintain national security and social stability.<sup>3</sup>

Such a theory of putting national security under military category and treating it as a military issue were undoubtedly a very traditional national security outlook.

In 1996, the Chinese government began to put forward new security ideas on international occasions. The term "New Security Concept" was introduced in 1997; the core of this new security concept was summarized as "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation" in 1999<sup>4</sup> and revised as "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination" in July 2001.<sup>5</sup> There was then a systematic exposition of the New Security Concept through the release of China's Position Paper on New Security Concept in July 2002.<sup>6</sup> However, this New Security Concept dealt only with external security and international security issues instead of complete national security issues. Up until it fell almost completely out of use after 2006, the expression "New Security Concept" had never been used to describe complete national security issues; its sphere had always been limited to external security and international security. Consequently, the "New Security Concept" denotes in contemporary China merely a non-traditional national security outlook in external and international security instead of a complete non-traditional national security outlook. Even if it could be called non-traditional, it was just a partial non-traditional national security outlook. Firstly, this is because it only deals with external national security issues, it is partial in the external-domestic aspect. Secondly, as it is mainly based on subjective wishes instead of objective observations, it is partial when considering the subjective and objective elements of national security. Thirdly, it discards traditional security issues by emphasizing non-traditional ones and is therefore partial in its understanding of the roles that traditional and non-traditional elements play in contemporary national security.

In addition, for the first five or six years of the 21st century, while "New Security Concept" was mainly used to express external security and international security, the

3 Jiang Zemin, "Speed up Reform and Opening-up and Modernization Efforts and Strive for Greater Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (October 12, 1992), Database of National Congresses of Communist Party of China, the People (江泽民:《加快改革开放和现代化建设步伐 夺取有中国特色社会主义事业的更大胜利》(1992年10月12日), 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库), <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313.html>.

4 Jiang Zemin, "Promote Disarmament and Safeguard International Security—Speech Delivered at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva" (March 26, 1993), The People (江泽民:《推动裁军进程 维护国际安全——在日内瓦裁军谈判会议上的讲话》(1999年3月26日), 人民网), <http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1999/jianghua/jh0005.html>.

5 Jiang Zemin, "Speech at the Rally in Celebration of the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of Communist Party of China" (July 1, 2001) Xinhua (江泽民:《在庆祝中国共产党成立八十周年大会上的讲话》(2001年7月1日)), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-12/03/content\\_499021.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-12/03/content_499021.htm).

6 China's Position Paper on New Security Concept (July 31, 2002), *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (《中国关于新安全观的立场文件》(2002年7月31日), 外交部网站), [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_chn/ziliao\\_611306/tytj\\_611312/t4549.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/t4549.shtml).

Chinese authorities began to talk more and more about other aspects national security, including some non-traditional national security issues. But national security as a whole was still put in the fields of military and national defense or foreign relations in important documents. The emphases of national security thinking and activities were still traditional securities issues centering on military and national defense and foreign security. Consequently, these years saw a transition from traditional to non-traditional in overall national security outlook instead of the formation of an overall non-traditional national security outlook. This can be seen in the report of the 16th NCCPC held in November 2002. But the report of the 17th NCCPC in 2007, while still reflecting the transition, has shown some non-traditional features in national security thinking and outlook.

We know that “security” and “national security” appeared only in the “Army Construction” chapter in the 14th NCCPC Report in 1992. For the 15th NCCPC Report in 1997, “security” was mentioned 6 times, with 3 times in the “Economy,” “People’s Livelihood,” and “International Issues” parts. But the other 3 times are still in the “Army Construction” part. The 16th NCCPC Report in 2002, in contrast, is the first document in NCCPC’s history that the term “security concept” has been mentioned and that the “New Security Concept” with “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, coordination” at its core is proposed. In addition, the word frequency of “security” more than doubled in the 16th NCCPC Report compared to that of the 15th NCCPC, increasing to 14 times. More importantly, the term “security,” including “national security,” appeared more in the “Economy,” “Politics” and other parts of the Report than in the “Army Construction” and “International Issues” parts, thus meaning that the Report took on certain non-traditional features in the domain of security, especially in national security.

Since the 16th NCCPC in 2002, “national security” has been used more and more frequently in various fields of social life. China began to use with increasing frequency in its official documents both traditional and non-traditional constituent elements, influencing elements, and hazardous elements of national security, such as political security, economic security, cultural security, and information security. What is more, while stressing the importance of traditional political and military forces in safeguarding national security, it began to touch upon the role that elements like economy, culture and science and technology play in safeguarding national security. Such a trend was fully demonstrated in both the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Ability Construction (hereafter referred to as Governance Ability Decision) adopted at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th CCCPC in 2004 and Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s on Some Major Issues in Building A Harmonious Socialist Society (hereafter referred to as Harmonious Society Decision) adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th CCCPC in 2006. But the trend at the time had not developed to the stage of establishing a complete non-traditional national security outlook.

The word “security” appeared altogether 16 times in the Governance Ability Decision, including “national security” 4 times. It appeared in expressions like “public security,” “the people’s personal safety and property security,” “new security concept,” “traditional security threats,” “non-traditional security threats,” “national security awareness,” “national security strategy,” “national security,” “(national security) work mechanism,” “political security,” “economic security,” “cultural security,” “information security,” and “national defense security.” Many of these expressions, such as “public security,” “national security awareness,” “national security strategy,” “national security,” “(national security) work mechanism,” “cultural security,” and “information security,” were not seen in previous NCCPC reports. The particular significance of the Governance Ability Decision is that it made the first systematic statement in the CPC’s history in the chapter with the heading of “Adhering to independent foreign policy of peace and keeping improving abilities to cope with international situation and handle international affairs.” It stated that the Party must “put national sovereignty and security above everything else and firmly uphold national security.” “To cope with the new situation brought about by interwoven traditional and non-traditional security threats, we must enhance national security awareness, improve national security strategy, and build a scientific, well-coordinated and efficient national security work mechanism.” “We must resolutely forestall separatist activities and activities of infiltration and subversion carried out by hostile forces, effectively forestall and tackle risks in the international economic field, so as to ensure the nation’s political, economic, cultural, and information security.”<sup>7</sup> Here, three points should be made about the Governance Ability Decision. First, the proposed “new security concept” was not a non-traditional national security outlook concerning overall national security. Although the Governance Ability Decision did not specify the contents and core of the new security concept in the proposal, with the long-established external bound focus of such a concept, the statements were still limited to foreign relations and international issues and did not touch upon overall national security. Second, the Governance Ability Decision repeated the judgment that “traditional and non-traditional security threats are interwoven,” a conclusion first put forward in the 16th NCCPC Report. But the main ideas in this judgment were still traditional security issues, with traditional and non-traditional threats in external security and international security as the focus. Third, although the Governance Ability Decision covered issues beyond military construction and foreign relations when it talked about security and national security, its general statement about national security was still seen in the part of “foreign relations”; it did not devote a separate part to this topic or discuss it within any other non-traditional security issues. Therefore, despite having some rudiments of non-traditional national security outlook within it, the Governance Ability Decision was, on the whole, still a

7 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Ability Construction (Adopted at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee on September 19, 2004), *The People*, (《中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定》(2004年9月19日中国共产党第十六届中央委员会第四次全体会议通过), 人民网), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/40531/40746/2994977.html>.

traditional national security outlook.

The Harmonious Society Decision, adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th CCCPC on October 11, 2006, once again made similar yet briefer special statements about national security than the Governance Ability Decision. It pointed out that it was necessary to “strengthen national security work and national defense construction and safeguard national stability and security.” “We must enhance national security awareness, perfect national security strategy, and establish scientific, well-coordinated, efficient work mechanisms so as to cope with various traditional and non-traditional security threats. We must strike hard at infiltrative, subversive, and sabotage activities of external and internal hostile forces to ensure the country’s political, economic, cultural, and information security.”<sup>8</sup> We can find through word frequency statistics that compared with the Governance Ability Decision in which “security” was mentioned 16 times (including “national security” 4 times), “security” appeared 24 times in the Harmonious Society Decision, including “national security” 5 times, but the term “New Security Concept” was no longer in the document. In fact, this term had almost gone out of use in important official documents at this point. The fade-out of the “New Security Concept” which is limited to external and international security without any announcement or attention towards internal security shows that China had in fact taken national security issues beyond external and international security into broad consideration and was thinking of a national security outlook that was broader and more comprehensive than “New Security Concept.” It is in this historic process that a holistic overall national security outlook was conceived. However, unlike the “New Security Outlook” with noticeable non-traditional security features, the Harmonious Society Decision displayed a predominance of traditional security thinking when it expounded domestic security issues as a whole. The non-traditional security elements such as “cultural security” and “information security” showed that while it was paying more attention to some non-traditional security issues, China still attributed chief threats to national security and social stability to hostile forces, reiterating that “the hostile forces’ infiltrative and sabotage activities endanger national security and social stability” and that it must “strike hard at infiltrative, subversive, and sabotage activities of external and internal hostile forces” to “ensure the nation’s political, economic, cultural and information security.” The Harmonious Society Decision failed to realize that various internal non-confrontational social conflicts, serious corruption within the Party, government, and the PLA in particular, inflicted grave threats and harm to national security, especially to internal security. It also failed to realize the crucial significance of maintaining national security, especially domestic security, through the establishment of justice, democracy, and rule of law in domestic

8 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s on Some Major Issues in Building a Harmonious Socialist Society (Adopted at the 6th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 11, 2006), Xinhua (《中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》(2006年10月11日中国共产党第十六届中央委员会第六次全体会议通过), 新华网), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content\\_5218639.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm).

political and social life. This suggests that the guiding philosophy behind the Harmonious Society Decision is still a traditional national security outlook.


However, as various constituent, influencing, and hazardous elements of non-traditional national security began to be mentioned more and more frequently and especially as national security issues were beginning to be discussed within the realm of domestic social issues, it became apparent that a non-traditional national security outlook was the shape of things to come. This was reflected in the Report of the 17th NCCPC in November 2007. The term “New Security Concept” was nowhere to be found in the Report. Instead of appearing in the section of “Armed Forces and National Defense Construction” or “International Relations and Foreign Policies” as it used to be, a systematic statement about national security was made in the paragraph with the topic sentence of “Improving social management and safeguarding social stability and unity” in the section of “Accelerating Social Development with the Focus on Improving People’s Well-being.” This is a major difference of the Report of the 17th NCCPC with previous NCCPC reports. The change of national security issues’ place in the Report suggests that the CPC Central Committee was convinced that the contemporary emphasis of national security was neither external nor military security issues; it was domestic social conflicts and issues and effective ways to solve them. The specific statement is as follows: “We must improve the strategy and mechanism for national security, and keep high vigilance against and resolutely forestall separatist, infiltrative and subversive activities in various forms to safeguard national security.” Nevertheless, national security is indeed inseparable from armed forces and national defense construction. Hence the Report talked about national security in the section “Opening Up New Prospects for Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces”: “Bearing in mind the overall strategic interests of national security and development, we must take both economic and national defense development into consideration and make our country prosperous and our armed forces powerful while building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.” “We will strengthen the People’s Armed Police so that it can better fulfill its duties of safeguarding national security and social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace.” This shows that non-traditional national security thinking has been expanded and intensified in the Report of the 17th NCCPC.

By 2012 when the 18th NCCPC was held, although there was not “overall national security outlook” in the sense of “conceptual existence,” a comprehensive and overall national security outlook had taken shape in the sense of “factual existence.”

According to word frequency statistics, the word “security” appears 4 times in the report of the 14th NCCPC held in 1992 with one of which being “national security,” 6 times in the report of the 15th NCCPC in 1997 with “national security” 3 times, 14 times in the report of the 16th NCCPC in 2002 with “national security” 3 times, and 23 times in the report of the 17th NCCPC in 2007 with “national security” 5 times. In the report of the 18th NCCPC in 2012, there were 36 direct references to “security.” Moreover, there are an additional 6 expressions that in effect express security (for



instance food and drug safety). Thus the total number comes to 42, with 4 direct references to “national security” and 2 expressions which in fact refer to “national security” (one is the “work mechanism” in “perfecting national security strategy and work mechanism” referring to the “national security work mechanism”; the other is the “security strategy” in “adapting to new requirements in national development and security strategy” referring to “national security strategy”). So the expression “national security” actually appears 6 times in the Report. The word frequency statistics of “security” and “national security” in those important documents is shown in Figure 1.



**Figure 1** Word Frequency of “Security” and “National Security” in NCCPC Reports

The 18th NCCPC Report mentions and discusses “security” and “national security” more than all previous CPC national congresses combined, suggesting that the CCCPC is attaching increasing importance to national security as it does with development. Despite the increased discussion about non-traditional security issues in various aspects, the focus of the Report is still on traditional security. Nevertheless, the Report shows more non-traditional contents and thinking in national security issues. First, there were more fields and statements concerning security in the Report, including many live non-traditional securities issues at the time, such as grain security, food security, medicine security, medical security, information security, cyberspace security, economic security, security of people’s lives and property, public security, ecology security, energy security, resource security, international security and so on. Second, the 18th NCCPC Report discusses national security mainly in the section of “Strengthening and making innovations in social management.” Such an arrangement follows the model of the 17th NCCPC Report which puts national security statements in the category “Improving social management and maintaining social stability and unity.” This shows that the CCCPC is attaching increased importance to domestic social security, considering it a priority among priorities in national security, which is in marked contrast with the

traditional security thinking where national security was perceived as political and military security. Both the expansion of security-related fields and the arrangement of national security in the Report suggest that the CCCPC is paying more and more attention to non-traditional security issues, including non-traditional national security issues, and that it puts the emphasis of its national security on domestic social security. Because the concept of “overall national security outlook” had not been proposed at the time, we can only call this security outlook the embryo, or the “factual existence,” of the overall national security outlook rather than the birth, or the “conceptual existence” of it.

The non-traditional overall security outlook did not come into “conceptual existence” until President Xi Jinping brought forth the “Overall National Security Outlook” and made systematic exposition of it in April 2014.

## **2. The ONSO Is a Comprehensive, Systematic, Advanced and Non-traditional National Security Outlook**

The ONSO is not just a non-traditional national security outlook; it is a complete, comprehensive, systematic, advanced and non-traditional national security outlook.

Strictly speaking, any national security outlook, as long as it deals with non-traditional national security issues, is regarded as a non-traditional national security outlook. However, if it deals only with non-traditional national security issues but pays no attention to or even excludes traditional national security issues, it can only be called a partial and low-form non-traditional national security outlook. The “New Security Concept” was once favored and advocated by China. If it can be called a non-traditional national security outlook at the level of international security and external security, it is merely a partial, low-form non-traditional national security outlook at the level of national security. It is partial in the national security domain because it deals only with external and international security and pays no attention to internal security. Meanwhile, although the “New Security Concept” involves both non-traditional and traditional elements in its composition, when it comes to security guarantees, it only emphasizes the role of non-traditional measures and approaches and does not touch upon and even deny the role of traditional measures and approaches in effect. It is, therefore, a partial low-form non-traditional security outlook even in the domain of international security. Only when a security outlook involves both non-traditional and traditional elements in composition, threat, and a guarantee of security can it become a comprehensive, advanced non-traditional security outlook. Only when a national security outlook deals with traditional and non-traditional national security issues completely, comprehensively, and systematically and makes dialectic observation and treatment of them can it become an advanced non-traditional national security outlook in a real sense; as the ONSO is.

The ONSO deals with both external and internal security issues and attaches special

importance to internal security, thus integrating the external and internal aspects of national security. It involves both the subjective pursuit and the objective situation in national security. The subjective pursuit and practical requirements in the ONSO are the results of careful observation and judgment of China's national security reality. In this way it accomplishes the unity of the subjective and the objective. Likewise, it achieves the unity of the traditional and the non-traditional in the aspects of constituent elements, threats, and guarantees of national security by dealing with both non-traditional and traditional national security issues. Therefore, the ONSO has surpassed not only traditional national security outlooks but also low-form non-traditional national security outlooks, including the "New Security Concept" that China had been advocating over the years.

The ONSO is an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. It is different from both traditional national security outlooks and low-form non-traditional national security outlooks. In order to grasp precisely the position of the ONSO in national security history and its relationship with various national security outlooks, it is necessary to classify the concept of "national security outlook" with logical methods. With the result of this classification we will be able to determine the position of the ONSO and study its characteristics.

When we made special studies on classification of national security outlooks as early as over a decade ago, we have come to the conclusion that neither the traditional national security outlook nor the non-traditional security outlook (the then "New National Security Concept") is a unified system of thought and that they are two categories of national security outlooks summarizing different national security thoughts. In terms of a traditional national security outlook, we believe that "logically speaking, traditional national security outlooks refer to those that had existed and played important roles from the birth of countries to the end of the Cold War. It includes various national security outlooks in state and international relations theories since modern times on the one hand, such as national security outlooks in idealist and realist theories, and ancient national security thoughts on the other, as evidenced by ideas about national security in ancient Chinese Confucian, Taoist, Legalist, and Military strategists' thoughts as well as observations made by ancient Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle."<sup>9</sup> Similarly, for non-traditional national security outlook, we also made specific explanation under the term of "New National Security Concept": "The 'New National Security Concept' is not a national security outlook with neither a unified system of thought nor even a common concept; it is a name given to recently proposed national security outlooks: 'other-reference' or 'self-reference.' 'Other-reference' means referring to ideas about recent national security that are proposed by others or that arouse wide interest as 'new national security outlook'."<sup>10</sup> For

9 Liu Yuejin, "On Classification of National Security Concepts," *Journal of Jiangnan Social University*, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23 (刘跃进:《国家安全观的分类问题》, 载《江南社会学院学报》, 2001年第4期, 第22-23页).

10 Liu Yuejin, "On Classification of National Security Concepts," *Journal of Jiangnan Social University*, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23 (刘跃进:《国家安全观的分类问题》, 载《江南社会学院学报》, 2001年第4期, 第22-23页).

instance, some researchers refer to thoughts about “common security” as a “common security outlook,” the ideas about “comprehensive security” as a “comprehensive security concept,” and ideas about “cooperative security” as a “cooperative security concept.”<sup>11</sup>“Self-reference’ means referring to one’s own new national security thoughts as “new national security outlook.”<sup>12</sup> For instance, Zhao Ying refers to what he proposes in his book entitled *A New National Security Concept* as a “new national security concept.”<sup>13</sup> Another example is the author of this paper’s reference to his own works: “From methodological and theoretical points of view, national security is a complicated social system and national security activities are complicated systems engineering. Therefore it is necessary to adopt systematic approaches to study theoretical and practical national security issues at different levels and establish a ‘systematic security outlook’.”<sup>14</sup> “The ‘Systematic Security Outlook’ can therefore be referred to as a ‘self-referred’ ‘new national security outlook’.”<sup>15</sup> Now I would like to propose specifically that “traditional national security outlook vs. non-traditional national security outlook” and “traditional security outlook vs. non-traditional security outlook” are two pairs of contradictory (not opposing) concepts derived from classification of their high concepts of “national security outlook” and “security outlook” with the logical dichotomy method. In more logical terms, “traditional national security outlook” is a positive concept whereas “non-traditional national security outlook” is a negative concept in contradiction. Likewise, “traditional security outlook” is a positive concept whereas “non-traditional security outlook” is a negative concept. Therefore, as far as security outlook is concerned, there is no possibility for the existence of a third outlook aside from traditional and non-traditional outlooks. In terms of national security outlook, there is not a third national security outlook except for traditional national security outlook and non-traditional national security outlook. Now that traditional security outlook, non-traditional security outlook, traditional national security outlook, and non-traditional national security outlook are all categorical names, there will inevitably be various more specific security outlooks or national security outlooks. If the “New Security Concept” put forth by the Chinese government at the turn of the century is a specific non-traditional security outlook under the category of “non-traditional security outlook,” then the “Overall National Security Outlook” is a non-traditional national security outlook under the category of “non-traditional national security outlook.”

11 Zhu Yangming, *On Asia-Pacific Security Strategies*, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2000, pp.131-135 (朱阳明:《亚太安全战略论》,北京:军事科学出版社2000年版,第131-135页)。


12 Liu Yuejin, “On Classification of National Security Concepts,” *Journal of Jiangnan Social University*, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23 (刘跃进:《国家安全观的分类问题》,载《江南社会学院学报》,2001年第4期,第22-23页)。

13 Zhao Ying, *A New National Security Concept—Confrontation and Choice beyond War*, Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 1992, pp.476-478 (赵英:《新的国家安全观——战争之外的对抗与抉择》,昆明:云南人民出版社1992年版,第476-478页)。

14 Liu Yuejin, “Systematic Security Concept and Its Three Levels,” *Journal of University of International Relations*, No.2 (2001), pp.3-9 (刘跃进:《系统安全观及其三层次》,载《国际关系学院学报》,2001年第2期,第3-9页)。

15 Liu Yuejin, “On Classification of National Security Concepts,” *Journal of Jiangnan Social University*, No.4 (2001), pp.22-23 (刘跃进:《国家安全观的分类问题》,载《江南社会学院学报》,2001年第4期,第22-23页)。

As the aim of this paper is to analyze the ONSO, the following discussion will be limited to “national security outlook” instead of the more general “security outlook.” Strictly speaking, the ONSO is a “national security outlook” with national security as its specific subject; it is not a general “security outlook” whose subject is uncertain and drifts around. Because we call the ONSO an advanced-form non-traditional national security outlook, this paper will talk about such concepts as “traditional national security outlook” vs. “non-traditional national security outlook” and “advanced-form non-traditional national security outlook” vs. “low-form non-traditional national security outlook.” If traditional national security concepts refer to national security outlooks in both history and practice that overplay the importance of military forces, politics, territory, and sovereignty but neglect and even deny the significant roles that non-traditional factors such as culture, science and technology, and ecology play in the domain of national security; then non-traditional national security concepts are those that recognize or stress to different extents the important roles non-traditional factors such as culture, science and technology, and ecology play in the same domain. In the same manner, low-form non-traditional national security outlooks refer to those national security outlooks that overplay the non-traditional but neglect and even deny the traditional elements in the national security domain whereas advanced non-traditional national security outlooks are those that taken into consideration both the traditional and the non-traditional in the same domain. It becomes obvious that the difference in understanding traditional and non-traditional national security issues is where the difference between traditional and non-traditional national security outlooks lies; so is the difference between the low-form and advanced non-traditional national security outlooks. Their relationships can be illustrated by Figure 2.



**Figure 2 Relations between National Security Outlooks and Issues**

According to Figure 2, traditional national security outlook is merely the reflection of traditional national security issues whereas the non-traditional one can be a mere reflection of non-traditional national security issues or reflection of both traditional and non-traditional national security issues. It is natural and necessary for non-traditional national security outlook to reflect non-traditional national security issues. Otherwise it would not be called a non-traditional national security outlook. However, it does not necessarily reflect traditional national security issues as this would not change its non-traditional nature. The difference is that when a non-traditional national security outlook only reflects non-traditional national security issues, it is a low-form non-traditional national security outlook; when it strikes a balance between non-traditional and traditional national security issues and deals with them from a holistic point of view, it becomes an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. The non-traditional national security outlook, therefore, includes low-form non-traditional national security outlook and advanced non-traditional national security outlook. The former is merely a reflection of non-traditional national security issues whereas the latter is the balanced and comprehensive reflection of both non-traditional and traditional national security issues. The ONSO is exactly an advanced non-traditional national security outlook which comprehensively reflects both non-traditional and traditional national security issues.

Obviously, the dividing line between advanced non-traditional national security outlook and low-form non-traditional national security outlook is whether the outlook deals with and emphasizes traditional national security issues while dealing with and emphasizing non-traditional security issues. The ONSO is called advanced and non-traditional mainly because it deals with and emphasizes both non-traditional and traditional national security issues and balances them from a holistic perspective. It is, therefore, different from the traditional national security outlook which deals only with traditional national security issues but neglects non-traditional national security issues and from the low-form non-traditional national security outlook which focuses on the non-traditional but ignores the traditional. The ONSO is best exemplified when Xi Jinping stresses that “We must attach importance to both traditional and non-traditional security.” In order to make an in-depth analysis of the advanced non-traditional security thinking in the ONSO, it is necessary to quote the whole statement: “We must attach importance to both traditional and non-traditional security and build a national security system that covers the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources.”<sup>16</sup> The eleven aspects of security mentioned in this statement are in fact constituent elements of contemporary national security. In other words, as far as constituent elements of national security are concerned, the ONSO integrates traditional and non-traditional national security elements by means of advanced non-traditional national security thinking. Xi

16 Xi Jinping, “Adhere to An Overall National Security Outlook and Explore a National Security Path with Chinese Characteristics,” Xinhua (习近平:《坚持总体国家安全观走中国特色国家安全道路》, 新华网), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c\\_1110253910.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm).

Jinping does not make a distinction between traditional and non-traditional national security elements in his statement. But according to our studies over the past decade, it is evident that the statement stresses that we must pay attention to both traditional national security elements such as political security, territorial security, military security, economic security, social security and resource security and non-traditional national security elements such as cultural security, science and technology security, information security, ecological security and nuclear security and make balanced and holistic consideration of these traditional and non-traditional elements.

It should be quite safe to classify political, territorial, and military security as traditional national security components. But it would cause quite a few raised eyebrows among certain security and national security researchers to add economic, social, and resource security to the traditional national security components. While they agree that these security elements are only emphasized by non-traditional national security outlooks, they consciously or unconsciously regard them as non-traditional elements. But such an understanding is incorrect, as it confuses subjective cognition with objective reality and fails to realize that objective things have long existed before they are known. There are such elements in the domain of national security. These elements attract the attention of subsequent non-traditional national security outlooks, but in fact they have existed for a very long time in national security history. Such national security elements include economic, social and resource security. Attention to and emphasis on these traditional elements are not realized in traditional national security outlooks but in non-traditional national security outlooks. Any national security outlook that pays attention to and stresses these components is not traditional but non-traditional. The ONSO's attention to and emphasis on these traditional national security elements, like its attention to and emphasis on non-traditional elements such as culture, science and technology, information, and ecology security, embodies non-traditional national security thinking. The ONSO lays stress on traditional and non-traditional elements which are only emphasized by non-traditional security outlooks on the one hand and attaches importance to traditional elements such as political, territory, and military security which have long been emphasized by traditional national security outlooks on the other. This dual emphasis makes it possible for the ONSO to integrate all of these elements into one single national security system and progress to an advanced non-traditional national security outlook.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that although only eleven national security elements are mentioned above, Xi Jinping actually included more elements in his exposition of the ONSO. Prior to the "traditional security and non-traditional security" statement, he mentioned a very important national security element, "people's safety" in his "attaching importance to both territorial security and people's safety" statement. Therefore, counting the "people's safety" element, the national security system the ONSO tries to build comprises not eleven but twelve national security components. It is a system made up of all national security issues discussed in the ONSO instead of any single national security constituent element. Actually the ONSO's emphasis on

“attaching importance to people’s safety” alone embodies advanced non-traditional national security thinking. Although people’s safety is a traditional national security element, like economic security, it does not receive much attention in traditional national security outlooks. In the domain of national security, any national security thinking that stresses the traditional element of safety of the people is not traditional but non-traditional; any national security outlook that is characterized by people-oriented or people-centered ideas and concepts is not traditional but non-traditional. It is not an ordinary non-traditional national security outlook; it is an advanced non-traditional national security outlook. The advanced and non-traditional qualities of the OSNO lie not only in its integrated consideration of traditional and non-traditional national security elements but also in its special emphasis on the significance of people’s safety as its main mission and ultimate goal. When Xi Jinping underlines two traditional national security components — “territorial security” and “people’s safety” through the statement that “We must value both territorial security and people’s safety, follow the people-foremost and people-oriented guideline, do all national security work for the people, rally support from the people, and effectively strengthen the mass basis of national security,” he adopts non-traditional national security thinking to emphasize the latter. To better understand this statement, it is necessary to point out that “traditional national security outlook and non-traditional national security outlook” as a pair of contradictory concepts in the subjective cognition field are different from “traditional national security elements and non-traditional national security elements” as a pair of contradictory concepts in the objective social field. “The people’s safety” by nature is a traditional national security element, but it was not given adequate attention in the traditional national security outlook. It is only in a non-traditional national security outlook, especially an advanced non-traditional national security outlook like the OSNO that it gets the attention it deserves. “People’s safety” is considered a traditional national security element because people are an indispensable basic component of any country and people’s safety is an indispensable basic component of national security, no matter the development stages of human society, the types of states in which people live and the place they have in any particular development stage or country. According to national security theories, people’s safety is the “native element” of national security instead of its “derived element.” For this reason, people’s safety must have been a traditional element in the field of national security; it could not be a non-traditional element that came into being more recently. But traditional national security outlooks have not attached due importance to the people of the country or their safety. They are recognized and emphasized only by non-traditional national security outlooks, especially by such advanced non-traditional national security outlooks as the OSNO.

The importance attached to people’s safety is shown in two similar terms used in Xi Jinping’s statements about the OSNO: “people’s safety” and “safety of the people.” The former has a strong connection with the “people foremost thought” in traditional Chinese culture and the latter is closely related to the classic Mass View of Marxism. Xi highlights people’s safety by juxtaposing it with territorial security and stresses the



special significance of safety of the people as the main mission of national security by comparing it with political, economic, military, cultural, and social security. He points out that we “must adhere to the Overall National Security Outlook, take safety of the people as its main mission, political security as its basic task, economic security as its foundation, military, cultural and social security as its guarantee, and promotion of international security as its support, and explore a national security path with Chinese characteristics.”<sup>17</sup> Despite their different names, “safety of the people” and “people’s safety” basically refer to the same thing in the domain of national security, that is, the safety of the people in the country. Based on analysis of Xi Jinping’s statements about safety of the people and public safety, we come to the following interpretation: “taking safety of the people as its main mission” is the general program of national security in present-day China; the emphasis on “people-foremost and people-oriented guideline” has connection with traditional Chinese culture and civilization of the whole human kind and points out the fundamental role of people in people-government relations and the kernel position of human beings in the relations between humans and things; “doing every national security work for the people” not only indicates the central place that safety of the people or people’s safety possess among all national security components but also suggests that it is the ultimate goal of all national security activities and most important of all highlights the people’s subjective status in the whole national security system; “rallying support for national security from the people” follows the CPC’s Mass Line tradition and contains the fundamental policy of “from the masses and to the masses” in national security work; and “effectively strengthening the mass basis of national security” is a general requirement that national security work must rely on the support from the people. In this way, the ONSO has applied the CPC’s main mission of “serving the people” and “governance for the people” principle to national security work and is indeed a heart-winning national security design and project.<sup>18</sup> This feature further enhances the ONSO’s status and strengthens its standing as an advanced non-traditional national security outlook.

In addition to its dual and integrated attention to both traditional and non-traditional elements and its emphasis on safety of the people in orientation, the ONSO, as an advanced non-traditional national security outlook, is an outlook that not only highlights the comprehensive, holistic, and systematic nature of national security in theory but also incorporates various national security elements in practice and has developed into a comprehensive, overall, and systematic national security outlook.<sup>1920</sup>

17 Xi Jinping, “Adhere to An Overall National Security Outlook and Explore a National Security Path with Chinese Characteristics,” Xinhua (习近平:《坚持总体国家安全观走中国特色国家安全道路》, 新华网), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c\\_1110253910.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm).

18 Liu Yuejin, “Overall National Security Outlook: Public Foundation and Theoretical Origin,” *The People Forum*, No. 16 (2014), p. 25 (刘跃进:《总体国家安全观 ONSO: 民心基础与理论溯源》, 载《人民论坛》, 2014 年第 16 期, 第 25 页).

19 Liu Yuejin, “Overall National Security Outlook in the Grand Security Age — on the Philosophical Thoughts in Xi Jinping’s Major National Security-Related Speeches,” *Beijing Daily*, May 19, 2014 (刘跃进:《大安全时代的总体国家安全观 ONSO——学习习近平同志关于国家安全重要讲话中的哲学思想》, 载《北京日报》, 2014 年 5 月 19 日).

20 Liu Yuejin, “On the Five ‘Overalls’ in the Overall National Security Outlook,” *The People Forum (Academic Frontiers)*, No.17 (2014), pp. 14-20 (刘跃进:《论总体国家安全观 ONSO 的五个“总体”》, 载《人民论坛·学术前沿》, 2014 年第 17 期, 第 14-20 页).

### 3. The ONSO Consists of Rich Non-Traditional National Security Contents

Any non-traditional national security outlook, whether an advanced one which deals with both non-traditional and traditional issues, or a low-form non-traditional one which deals only with non-traditional issues, will put forward and stress non-traditional national security issues to different degrees. As an advanced non-traditional national security outlook, the ONSO not only deals with traditional national security issues but also pays attention to and highlights various non-traditional national security issues and turns them into rich non-traditional national security contents in the ONSO.

First of all, as far as national security composition is concerned, the ONSO deals with and highlights a large number of non-traditional security elements, which is exemplified by the five non-traditional national security elements, i.e. culture, science and technology, information, nuclear security among the eleven security elements mentioned in Xi Jinping's remark of "attaching importance to both traditional and non-traditional security."

Of the five non-traditional national security elements, cultural security and science and technology security came into existence relatively early, emerging approximately in modern times. But because they did not play any major role in modern traditional national security practice, they are not considered traditional national security elements in modern times. Obviously, cultural security and science and technology security do not belong to traditional national security elements, not because they were overlooked in traditional national security outlook (in fact they were), but because they played an insignificant role in traditional national security practice. As both derived elements and newborn elements of national security, information security and ecological security are the most obvious non-traditional national security elements. As for nuclear security, obviously it is a non-traditional national security element. But it is not a first-class national security element like culture, science and technology, information, and ecology security; it is a third-class element under the traditional military and resource security categories and the non-traditional science and technology security category. Under the category of military security, nuclear security is a constituent element of weaponry and equipment security and a nuclear weapon security issue; under the resource security category, it is a constituent element of nuclear resource and a nuclear resource security issue; under the science and technology category, it is a constituent element of technological application security and a nuclear application security issue.

Such analysis of nuclear security brings forth a new question: if nuclear security is a non-traditional national security element, then why is it under the traditional categories of military security and resource security? Indeed this is an example of the complicated relationship between traditional national security and non-traditional security. It is likely that there are some non-traditional elements among the second or third-class elements under the category of a particular traditional national security element. Likewise, it is likely that there are some traditional elements among the second or third-class elements under the category of a particular non-traditional national security

element. The incorporation of traditional nuclear weapon security under the traditional military security element category is a case in point; so is the non-traditional nuclear resource security under the traditional resource security element category. Of course, it is possible that there are traditional national security elements under certain non-traditional security element categories. For instance, there is the traditional national secret security issue under the non-traditional information security category. This suggests the complicated overlap and interpenetration between traditional and non-traditional national security elements.

Therefore, there may be more non-traditional national security elements in the ONSO in addition to cultural security, science and technology security, information security, ecological security and nuclear security. It is very likely that there are more second and third-class non-traditional elements within traditional national security elements such as safety of the people, political security, territorial security, military security, economic security, social security, and resource security. Not all of these non-traditional national security elements are listed in President Xi's remarks about the ONSO. But we must reveal each and every one of them if we are to conduct an in-depth study of the ONSO. It will enable us to deepen our understanding of the non-traditional quality of the ONSO and probe further into the diversity, multi-polarity, complexity, and richness of these non-traditional national security elements.

Secondly, in terms of the environment of national security, the ONSO involves many contributory factors and threats to national security, the most important of which is a non-traditional element: terrorism.

In his exposition of the ONSO on April 15, 2014, Xi Jinping did not use expressions like "environment of national security" or "contributory factors and threats of national security." But the appeal to "enhance adversity consciousness and exercise vigilance in peace time" indicates that there are worries and troubles in present-day Chinese national security. The "elements" in "unprecedented complicated internal and external elements" refer to national security threats, in other words, domestic worries and external troubles. Arguments like "development is the foundation of security" and "only a prosperous country can have a strong military" explain the influence of development and wealth on national security.

On an early occasion, President Xi Jinping made direct reference to "noticeable increase in predictable and unpredictable risks" when expounding the necessity of the founding of the National Security Commission at the 3rd plenary session of the 18th NCCPC in November 2013.<sup>21</sup> This was, in effect, classification of the threats to national security from the "predictable/unpredictable" dimension. In fact, since the 16th NCCPC, there has been another kind of categorization of national security threats, i.e., "traditional/non-traditional security threats." Such categorization was frequently seen in the 16th NCCPC Report, Resolutions of the 4th and 6th Plenary Sessions of the 16th

21 Xi Jinping, "Explanatory Notes for 'the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform'," Xinhua (习近平:《关于〈中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定〉的说明》, 新华网), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-11/15/c\\_118164294.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm).

CCCPC, the 17th and 18th NCCPC Reports and other important documents concerning national security and is considered an effective approach in categorizing threats of national security even to this day. Thus there are three kinds of classification of national security threats: the internal/external perspective, the predictable/unpredictable dimension, and the traditional/non-traditional approach. The application of the three classification methods depends on particular cases. When we come to this issue in our studies of national security theories over the years, we usually adopt the natural/social and internal/external classification methods.

After proposing the ONSO, Xi Jinping made a special speech on national security at the 14th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on April 25, 2015. He pointed out that “in the new situation, our country’s national security and social stability are facing growing threats and challenges and the coupling effect between the threats and challenges are especially noticeable.”<sup>22</sup> The “threats and challenges” twice mentioned here refer to various elements jeopardizing national security. Xi also talked about the fight against terrorism in his speech, reiterating that “violent terrorist activities show no regard for fundamental human rights, trample on humanity and justice and challenge the very bottom line of human civilization. Violent terrorism is not an ethnic or religious issue but the common enemy of people of all ethnic groups.” He pointed out the country must “resolutely suppress and strike hard at separatist, infiltrative, and sabotage activities of external and internal hostile forces on the pretext of ethnic issues.” Obviously, terrorism, hostile forces, separatism, infiltration, and sabotage are all elements posing immediate threat and harm to national security. It is arguable to some people that the hostile forces, separatism, infiltration and sabotage mentioned here are traditional elements endangering national security and that only terrorism is a non-traditional one. But the majority of the elements embodied in various social and political endeavors to “maintain national security” are non-traditional. In fact there are many social elements, especially non-traditional elements, in the speech. Specifically speaking, Xi urges governments at different levels to “hold high the banner of national unity” and “strengthen and improve leadership of grassroots Party organizations and governments and engage in careful and thorough work for the people.” “Grassroots authorities must properly use ethnic and religious policies to handle conflicts that affect ethnic unity,” “maintain social harmony and stability,” “prevent and solve social conflicts,” “make earnest efforts to achieve comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development,” “safeguard and improve people’s livelihood,” “promote social fairness and justice and enhance the well-being of the people,” “coordinate interests of all parties,” “make sure the fruits of development benefit all people still more and equally,” “uphold the people’s legal rights and interests,” and so on.

However, all contributory factors and threats to national security, whether they

22 “Effectively Safeguard National Security and Social Stability and Create Favorable Social Environment for Accomplishment of Objectives,” *The People* (《切实维护国家安全和社会安定 为实现奋斗目标营造良好社会环境》, 人民网), <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0427/c1024-24946690.html>.

are traditional or non-traditional, are contents that the ONSO should involve and incorporate. It is necessary to use the theoretical analysis framework of national security developed over the years to analyze the contributory factors and threats of national security that the ONSO directly or indirectly involves and those it should.

According to theoretical studies in national security over the years, we think contributory factors and threats of national security can be classified from the natural/social and the domestic/external aspects. From the natural/social dimension, natural contributory factors of national security include mainly national territorial area, geographic location, natural resources, climate, and population; the social elements can be further classified as domestic and external elements. The domestic elements consists of the state system, cardinal policy, quality of citizen, ethnic and religious issues and so on; the external elements mainly includes the theme of the times, world structure, international order and relations with neighboring countries. Figure 3 gives a brief description of these elements.

Threats to national security can also be divided into two groups: natural elements (natural calamities) and social elements (man-made disasters). The former includes flood, waterlogging, drought, earthquake, insect plague, epidemic, windstorm and fire; the latter can be further divided into internal elements (domestic troubles) and external elements (foreign aggression). Internal elements include civil war, domestic turmoil, separatism, sabotage, extremism, and domestic terrorism; external elements





Figure 3 Contributory Factors of National Security

include military invasion, political subversion, cultural infiltration, covert operation, and international terrorism and so on. Figure 4 gives a brief description of the threats of national security.



**Figure 4 Threats to National Security**

Of the elements listed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, some are traditional security elements, some are non-traditional security elements. The latter deserves more attention and study in understanding the ONSO. Among the contributory factors and threats to national security, natural resources and population are non-traditional natural elements to a great extent; nationality, religion, and theme of the times are mainly non-traditional social elements. Among the elements endangering national security, natural disasters are basically traditional elements, so are most man-made calamities. Only international terrorism and domestic terrorism are relatively apparent non-traditional elements. Separatism and extremism, although often treated as non-traditional elements, are traditional elements with quite a long history and have done serious harm.

These contributory factors and threats to national security were not mentioned in Xi Jinping’s speech expounding the ONSO on April 15, 2015. In his speech delivered at the collective study session of CCCPC Politburo on April 25, Xi made a list of national security elements, such as terrorism, hostile forces, separatism, infiltration, sabotage, nationality, religion, the mass, social conflicts, people’s livelihoods, justice and so on,


some of which are shown in the Figures and some are not. Nonetheless, many elements are indeed in both Xi's speech on April 25 and the two Figures, including traditional security elements that endanger national security, such as terrorism, separatism, sabotage and infiltration, and non-traditional security elements that affect national security, such as nationality and religion. In order to fully understand and make in-depth study of the elements that affect and endanger national security, including both traditional and non-traditional elements, we must try to take into consideration various elements and make them organic components of the ONSO when we study and implement the ONSO.

Finally, because the maintenance and guarantee of national security is key to the ONSO, it discusses various measures to maintain and guarantee national security, including large amounts of non-traditional national security guarantee measures with strategic significance.

As traditional national security attaches special importance to political security and political power security, it relies heavily on military offence and defense and political suppression in safeguarding national security. In contrast, non-traditional security outlooks, be they non-traditional international security concepts, non-traditional national security outlooks, or non-traditional general security outlooks, all emphasize the important roles of non-traditional measures and approaches, often at the expense of neglecting or even denying the roles of traditional measures and approaches. Unlike various low-form non-traditional security outlooks with lopsided emphasis on non-traditional measures, the ONSO, as an advanced non-traditional national security outlook, balances both traditional and non-traditional measures and approaches and emphasizes the fundamental role of the latter.

In our studies of national security theories for over ten years, we have developed a system to classify national security guarantee measures and approaches. First the guarantee of national security is divided into guarantee mechanism and activities. Then the former is further divided into the hardware and the software, the latter is further divided into hard measures and soft measures. The concrete measures and approaches are list according to the classifications (See Figure 5).

As illustrated by Figure 5, the software of national security safeguarding mechanism consists of law (the legal system of national security), system (national security system), concept (national security outlook), strategy (national security strategy), policy (national security policy), management (national security management), will of the people (popular support), democracy (building of democratic politics) and so on; the hardware of national security safeguard mechanism comprises military forces, political organs, intelligence agencies, economy and trade, culture and education, diplomatic organs and foreign affairs departments. Accordingly, the operations of the former include economic development, national security publicity and public relations, national security education, political and social reform and innovation, diplomatic and foreign-related activities; whereas the operations of the latter include military offence and defense, political suppression, intelligence and security, imprisonment and exile



**Figure 5 National Security Guarantee Mechanism**

and so on.

It is obvious that the categorization and listing of national security safeguarding mechanisms in Figure 5 are not conducted from the traditional/non-traditional tag but from the mechanism/operation and hardware/software perspectives, with both traditional and non-traditional contents in each category.

The emphasis of the ONSO and President Xi Jinping’s remarks on national security is on neither the components of national security nor the contributory factors and threats of national security. Instead, the emphasis is on the maintenance and guarantee of national security. But it does not attempt to classify the national security issues according to the traditional/non-traditional perspective; seldom does it make rigid classification of national security measures and approaches. The argument in the ONSO is developed mainly according to the logical order in practical work.

In order to show that the emphasis of President Xi Jinping’s arguments concerning the ONSO is put on the maintenance and guarantee of national security, that these arguments do not classify issues of national security guarantee from the traditional/non-traditional dimension, and that these issues of national security maintenance and guarantee include both traditional and non-traditional measures and approaches, the paper will make an in-depth analysis in sequential order of the main paragraphs of President Xi’s speech while chairing the first meeting of the National Security Commission on April 15, 2015.

First, the speech stresses that “we must accurately grasp new features and tendencies in changes in national security situation, adhere to an overall national security outlook and explore a national security path with Chinese characteristics.” These are new general requirements in maintaining and safeguarding national security that are both traditional and non-traditional. The requirement that “we accurately grasp new features and tendencies in changes in national security situation” is a common and traditional



practice in the work of the Party, government and army, as it is in the field of national security. However, the requirement that we must “adhere to an overall national security outlook” is a brand new non-traditional measure in national security and serves as a guiding principle in China’s national security work. There is no difference between the speech’s stress on “Chinese characteristics” in exploring a national security path and the emphasis put on “Chinese characteristics” in other fields. However, compared with the practice of other countries in their national security work and that of China’s in the past, the application of this general principle to the field of national security is quite new and strongly non-traditional and is therefore an important non-traditional national security guarantee measure.

Second, the “adversity consciousness” and “vigilance in peace time” in the speech are important ideas in traditional Chinese national security thoughts. Taking “enhancing adversity consciousness and exercising vigilance in peace time” as a “major principle” in running the Party and the country means taking it as a major principle in safeguarding national security. To the Chinese, such a principle is undoubtedly a traditional way of thinking and approach to safeguarding national security.

Third, the speech points out that the purpose of establishing the National Security Committee (NSC) is to “better adapt to the new national security situation and new tasks of our country, build a centralized, unified, efficient and authoritative national security system so as to strengthen the leadership of national security work.” It is a common practice to establish organizations and set up efficient mechanisms to ensure national security. But for China, considering its relatively weak efforts in this regard, it is more or less non-traditional.

Fourth, the speech puts forth a series of guidelines in national security work: “taking safety of the people as its main mission, political security as its basic task, economic security as its foundation, military, cultural and social security as its guarantee, and promotion of international security as its support.” Among these guidelines, “taking political security as its basic task” and “taking military security as its guarantee” are obvious traditional security measures. The rest of the guidelines are all crucial non-traditional measures and approaches to safeguarding national security in present-day China. Note that “taking safety of the people as its main mission” does not mean it is up to the people to safeguard national security. Instead, it means that the ultimate goal of safeguarding national security is to safeguard the people’s safety and interests. This is a new national security philosophy with remarkable non-traditional features and constitutes the fundamental principle of contemporary Chinese national security work.

Fifth, the speech declares that China will “attach importance to both domestic and external security. Domestically, it will pursue development, reform, and stability and foster a safe environment; externally, the country will seek peace, cooperation, a win-win situation and a harmonious world.” This declaration classifies national security guarantee measures into domestic and external measures and makes a list of specific measures and approaches. Among these measures and approaches, only the “pursuit of peace” can be regarded as a traditional national security guarantee measure for its

traditional feature. In comparison, the pursuit of “development, reform, stability,” “safe environment,” “cooperation,” “win-win situation,” and “harmonious world” are all non-traditional national security guarantee measures and approaches.

Sixth, the speech stresses that China “must value both territorial security and the safety of its people, follow the people-foremost and people-oriented guideline, rally support from the people, and effectively strengthen the mass basis of national security.” Such a statement displays remarkable non-traditional features. The measures and approaches mentioned here, including “following the people-foremost and people-oriented guideline,” “rallying support from the people,” and “strengthening the mass basis,” seem to be traditional, for they either reflect traditional Chinese history and culture or model themselves on the traditional mission and work methods of the CPC. But in the field of national security, they are non-traditional guarantee measures and approaches to national security.

Seventh, the speech reiterates that China “must attach importance to both traditional security and non-traditional security and build a unified national security system that covers the spheres of politics, territory, the military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear and natural resources.” Here the security in these eleven fields should be considered as components of national security rather than guarantee measures of national security. When these components are assembled to “build a unified national security system,” they are in fact the targets or objectives of national security guarantees. This demonstrates not only traditional security thinking but also a large measure of non-traditional security characters.

Eighth, although the speech centers on national security, it associates security with development and calls for “attaching importance to both development and security,” pointing out that “development is the foundation of security, which is the pre-condition of development. Only a prosperous country can have a strong military, which in turn can protect the country.” This demonstrates dialectic non-traditional security thinking. The statement about the significance of development for national security suggests that all-round development is an important force in national security guarantee. Moreover, it is a non-traditional guarantee of national security.

Ninth, in addition to linking security with development, the speech connects China’s own national security with other countries’ national security and international security, thus endowing the ONSO with a broad international outlook and epochal features. Such open-mindedness in security provides a non-traditional approach to guaranteeing national security. “China will not only pay attention to its own security, but also to common security. China will seek to form a community of common destiny and promote all parties involved to seek mutual benefit, interests and common security.” Here along with the aforementioned “reliance on international security,” the goal of “common security,” the forging of “a community of common destiny,” and the pursuit of “mutual benefit and interests,” are all important non-traditional ideas and measures meant to safeguard China’s national security in connection with other countries’ security and international security.

Tenth, “The National Security Commission should follow the principles of centralized and unified leadership and scientific planning and concentrate concerted and result-oriented efforts on issues of priority in national security work.” This statement is about the work principles and concrete methods of the National Security Commission. These principles and methods, if applied to national security and put in comparison with other countries’ national security activities and China’s national security work in the past, display unprecedented non-traditional qualities in many aspects.

It is customary nowadays to classify national security issues as traditional and non-traditional. It is true that underlining “non-traditional” would lend more “novel” elements to national security work and research. But such non-traditionalism for non-traditionalism’s sake would inevitably bring on negative effects to national security work and research. Although the ONSO discusses the difference between the traditional and the non-traditional and calls for integrated treatment of the two at certain points, it does not attempt to rigidly and mechanically classify everything in the whole national security domain as “traditional” and “non-traditional.” In addition to appropriate traditional/non-traditional classification, the ONSO is flexible enough to adopt the internal/external classification or enumerate issues in order of priority, integrating the traditional and the non-traditional into overall national security issues and argumentation. The ONSO thus becomes a non-traditional national security outlook. But it is not a low-form non-traditional national security outlook; it is an advanced non-traditional national security outlook that integrates the traditional and the non-traditional. Non-traditional national security issues are addressed in the ONSO; as are traditional national security issues. The ONSO does not ignore traditional national security issues when talking about rich non-traditional national security issues. The focuses of attention in this article are the non-traditional qualities and contents of the ONSO, because these non-traditional national security issues dominate current national security in the country and demand primary attention and prompt solutions if the ONSO is to be put into practice. The ONSO is “non-traditional” because it concerns and highlights various non-traditional national security issues; it is “overall” because it pays dual attention to and makes overall planning for both traditional and non-traditional national security issues; and it is “advanced” because it integrates traditional and non-traditional national security issues through non-traditional thinking. It is true that we should pay attention to traditional national security issues outlined in the ONSO, but we should attach more importance to non-traditional national security issues. While developing a holistic understanding of the statements about traditional and non-traditional security issues outlined in the ONSO, we must focus our study especially on the non-traditional contents that have been long neglected in the past. More importantly, attention should be paid to the non-traditional security thinking in the ONSO.

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